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Abstract 
The relationship between natural resources and conflict has been extensively 
scrutinised in the field of peace and conflict studies. However, the effect of the 
ownership structure of resource extraction on violence requires further 
investigation. This thesis aims to describe the relationship between private and 
state-owned resource extraction and the severity of violence that states 
experience in Africa and Latin America 1989-2014. I argue that the ownership of 
resource extraction is significant because potential rebel groups will commit to 
the most effective and feasible strategy of violence depending on the 
anticipated response from the government and extraction company. When 
resource extraction is privately owned, rebel groups will use low-level violence, 
whereas, when resource extraction is state-owned, rebel groups are more likely 
to initiate high-level violence and civil war. These conjectures are tested with a 
quantitative logistic regression analysis of the relationship between ownership of 
extraction and violence severity. I have collected original data on the 
ownership of mineral and oil and gas extraction projects for these countries 
1989-2014 The results suggest when resource extraction is privately owned the 
likelihood of higher levels of violence decreases, and when resource extraction 
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1. Introduction 
For centuries the world has been plagued by conflict. In the field of peace and 
conflict studies, scholars endeavour to understand what exacerbates violence 
and causes conflict to occur. One school of peace and conflict studies, 
working alongside political, economic and social science scholars, 
concentrates on the relationship between natural resources and conflict. 
Natural resources are a source of riches, the control and ownership of which is 
often at the centre of the resource conflict debate. Natural resources have 
been under the control of governments, international corporations, small 
companies, local councils and individuals. This thesis aims to describe the 
relationship between private and state-ownership of natural resources, 
particularly the extraction of high-valuable resources, and the severity of 
violence states may experience – with particular reference to Africa and Latin 
America 1989-2014. 
The problem  
There is a substantial body of literature that addresses resource abundance 
and resource governance, and how these factors can contribute to the onset 
of violence. Peace and conflict scholars, when investigating the causes of 
conflict initially concluded that poor and underdeveloped states were more 
prone to conflict, compared to rich and developed states (Mac Ginty & 
Williams, 2009). However, scholars observed that some states have abundant 
natural resources that should contribute to state wealth and development yet 
remain poor and continue to foster violence and conflict (Macartan 
Humphreys, 2005). The phenomenon, labelled the ‘resource curse’, suggests 
that states remain poor and plagued by violence because they have a limited 
state capacity that cannot effectively govern high-value natural resources 
(Collier & Hoefffler, 2012). Therefore, scholars have since investigated the 
‘resource curse’ vigorously, by analysing what factors and contexts associated 
with natural resources contribute to violence escalation.   
Research suggests that effective governance of natural resources is essential to 
ensure that the wealth associated with its extraction is redistributed in a manner 
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that fosters prosperous and peaceful societies. However, this is not always the 
case in reality, as shown by the number of violent conflicts that occur in 
resource rich states. States, for example the Republic of Congo, that have 
abundant natural resources being extracted, but that have weak and corrupt 
governance systems, tend to be more prone to conflict than resource rich 
states with strong accountable governance systems (Indra De Soysa & 
Neumayer, 2007; Englebert & Ron, 2004). Resource-conflict scholars suggest 
that a strong state capacity, with effective, transparent and accountable 
management systems, is required to ensure that revenue associated with 
resource extraction is redistributed fairly and effectively (Indra De Soysa & 
Neumayer, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; V  Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013). A strong state 
capacity reduces the likelihood of marginalisation within the population and 
minimises the prospects of violence inducing behaviour.  
Natural resources are important for explaining the behaviour of non-state 
groups as well as state groups, particular, the wealth associated with natural 
resources. In addition to investigating the state’s ability to distribute resource 
wealth, the role of resource wealth in the hands of individuals and non-political 
groups is important in the analysis of resources and violence. Some natural 
resources are easily accessed and exploited, resources such as alluvial gold 
and diamonds, compared to resources such as oil and copper which are not 
as easy to access and exploit. ‘Lootable’ resources have been known to 
contribute to violence, and sustaining resource wars (P Lujala, Gleditsch, & 
Gilmore, 2005). For example, in Angola and Sierra Leone, rebel groups have 
used diamonds to finance and prolong conflicts (Kawamoto, 2012; M. Ross, 
2006). The type of natural resources a state has is important in order to 
understand how they may influence society and individuals’ propensity for 
violence (Fjelde, 2009; M. Ross, 2006; Snyder, 2006). Some forms of natural 
resources that are easy to exploit and use to finance rebellions may increase 
the likelihood of violence occurring.   
The financial influence of natural resources not only impacts state capacity and 
rebel financing, it also influences the social and economic environment of the 
state. Different types of natural resources require different forms of investment 
and extraction methods; in particular there is a difference between extracting 
oil and extracting diamonds. Some resources, such as oil, coal, and copper, 
require capital-intensive infrastructure and technology to extract sufficient 
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resources to exploit (Acuña, 2015). The global trend of privatisation following 
the end of the Cold War meant that more countries were encouraging private 
and multinational corporations to invest in their industries, particularly in natural 
resource extraction (Acuña, 2015). This meant there were increasing numbers of 
outsiders participating within the natural resource sectors of developing and 
developed countries. Due to the specialised nature of capital-intensive natural 
resources, they tend impact the state in the following ways. Capital-intensive 
resource extraction influences indigenous populations, in regard to land access 
and ownership, as well as long-term financial benefits for the government 
(Acuña, 2015; Gomez & Sawyers, 2012). There is the potential for indigenous 
populations to foster ill feelings towards companies and the government if they 
feel their rights are overlooked in the prospect of large profits from the 
exploitation of natural resources (Acuña, 2015; Altman, 2012). Therefore, the 
governance of resource extraction, minimising the environmental impact and 
maximising community involvement, is thought to be an important factor when 
considering the affect that resource extraction has on the onset of violence.  
Arising from the body of literature discussed above, and further in the literature 
review chapter of this thesis, there is a gap in the knowledge of resources and 
conflict. The gap in the literature is in regard to how the ownership of resource 
extraction may influence the severity of violence a state will experience. 
Scholars who have investigated the relationship between natural resources and 
violence have only touched on how the ownership of resource extraction 
could influence violence and conflict onset. In particular, Tim Wegenast (2015) 
investigated whether ownership of oil and gas extraction had an impact on the 
onset of intrastate conflict (T. Wegenast, 2015). The results of Wegenast’s (2015) 
study conclude that there is a curvilinear relationship between oil and gas 
production and the onset of civil conflict (T. Wegenast, 2015). Wegenast (2015) 
suggests that state-owned oil and gas production is more likely to encourage 
peace-buying mechanisms such as nepotism and coercion (T. Wegenast, 
2015). Therefore, Wegenast (2015) finds that internal violence was more likely 
when oil and gas extraction was state-owned, and that private owned oil and 
gas had little to no effect on the onset of intrastate violence (T. Wegenast, 
2015). The results from Wegenast’s (2015) study contribute to the literature by 
showing that ownership does matter when investigating natural resources and 
violence. This thesis differs from Wegenast’s (2015) study in the following ways: 
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(1) I operationalise ownership differently from Wegenast, I use the majority 
owner of production measured through the number of active operations, as 
opposed to majority owner of production measured through gross domestic 
product, (2) I look at a wider range of natural resources, to include mineral 
resources in addition to oil and gas, and (3) I look at the severity of violence, 
not just conflict onset (T. Wegenast, 2015). 
Purpose of the study  
This thesis aims to address the gap in the literature by examining the effect that 
of ownership of resources has on the severity of violence. This study will 
enhance the work done by Wegenast (2015) by expanding the type of 
resources examined to include all high-value resources, such as gold, copper, 
and phosphate in addition to oil and gas. I will conduct a quantitative logistic 
regression analysis, which will illustrate the relationship between my dependent 
and independent variables. The dependent variable in this study is the severity 
of violence, which is measured through the best estimate of fatalities, as 
recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Georeferenced 
Event Dataset (Croicu & Sundberg, 2015). There are four independent variables 
in this study representing the types of ownership of resource extraction I am 
investigating; each independent variable represents private or state-owned oil 
and gas extraction and private or state-owned mineral extraction. This study will 
use the independent and dependent variables, ownership and resource 
extraction and the severity of violence, to investigate what the relationship 
looks like in Africa and Latin America 1989-2014. I am using these two continents 
because both regions have experienced numerous conflicts and both have an 
abundance of a variety of natural resources. 
Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework provided in this thesis contributes to our 
understanding of what causes violence to occur in states with natural resource 
extraction. In order to develop hypotheses, a theoretical understanding of 
what motivates potential rebel groups to instigate violence is required. I 
understand the motivation of rebel groups to be a combination of grievance 
and opportunity. Within the established literature on resource-conflicts, scholars 
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have argued for the importance of grievances, opportunities and feasibility in 
understanding the causes of violence (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009). In the 
theory chapter of this thesis I outline each of these theories, and explain how 
grievance and opportunity theories contain the strongest arguments for how 
different ownership of resource extraction could influence potential rebels 
when instigating violence. I argue that potential rebel groups will decide on the 
most effective level of violence necessary to fulfil the group goals, depending 
on if the extraction is privately owned or state-owned. More specifically, I argue 
that when there is private owned extraction, potential rebel groups will 
perceive that low-level violence and extortion is the most effective course of 
action. Potential rebel groups will weigh up the costs and benefits associated 
with instigating violence against resource extraction, and how the resource 
extraction company is likely to respond, whether they are likely to be met with 
violence or concessions. I expect that when resource extraction is privately 
owned, the state and the extraction company is more likely to respond with 
negotiation and concessions, or order to minimise the impact on production, 
profit and reputation. In anticipation of this, potential rebel groups will initiate 
low-level violence because it will be the most effective strategy. Conversely, 
when resource extraction is state-owned, the resource extraction company is 
more likely to pass the costs of violence and conflict on to the state, which has 
the ability to absorb the costs associated with conflict and violence.  Because 
the state has the monopoly on violence, and is most likely to respond with 
violent repression, potential rebel groups will prepare for high-level violence 
and civil war. 
Research question, Hypotheses and Research Design 
The primary research question used to guide this thesis is; what effect does the 
ownership of resource extraction have on the severity of violence states 
experience? Using this research question, and based from the theoretical 
framework outlined in the theory chapter of this thesis I formulated two 
hypotheses. Firstly, I hypothesise that states with privately owned extraction 
would be more likely to experience low-level violence and extortion from 
groups attempting to redress grievances. Secondly, I hypothesise that states 
with state-owned extraction will be more likely to experience high-level 
violence and civil war onset. I will test these hypotheses through a logistic 
	   6	  
regression where the results provided will tell me the direction of the relationship 
between my independent variables, type of extraction ownership, and 
dependent variable, level of violence. From this analysis I will be able to test 
whether there is a positive or negative relationship between the level of 
violence and the type of ownership of resource extraction, and how statistically 
significant this correlation could be. In particular, the relationship illustrated from 
the analysis will show whether state-owned or privately owned resource 
extraction is likely to see an increase in the level of violence from low-level to 
high-level.   
The results of this thesis tell us what effect ownership of resource extraction has 
on the severity of violence in Africa and Latin America 1989-2014. However, one 
could use the results as a base for what might happen in other states and 
regions, if they have similar resource extraction patterns and policies. The results 
produced in this study suggest private ownership of resource extraction is less 
likely to encourage high-level violence from potential rebel groups, and that 
state-owned extraction is more likely to encounter high-level violence and civil 
war. I also find that the relationship between ownership of resource extraction 
and the level of violence is particularly significant for private mineral extraction 
in Africa, and for oil and gas extraction in Latin America. This study provides a 
robust base for understanding the relationship between ownership of resource 
extraction and violence, and opens the pathway for further research on a 
global scale.   
Significance of the study 
This study contributes to the literature on resource-conflicts by providing an 
understanding of how private and state-owned extraction of high-value 
resources, effects the onset and severity of direct violence. Natural resources 
have been shown to have an impact of the onset, severity and duration of 
violence. The ownership of resource extraction is another potential connection 
between resources and violence, particularly since private ownership of natural 
resource extraction is increasing over time within Africa and Latin America; 
therefore, it is important to understand what effects this might have on peace. 
Policy and decision makers could use the results produced from this study when 
evaluating natural resource policy and the impact that natural resource 
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extraction can have on negative peace. The results will provide further 
understanding to what we already know about the causes of violence, and 
how communities and governments perceive the costs and benefits of 
resource extraction. Decision makers from extraction companies, development 
think tanks, and non-governmental organisations throughout the international 
community could utilise the results from this thesis to assist the international 
community’s goals of eradicating direct violence and contribute to effective 
and inclusive development strategies. 
Summary 
This thesis addresses the gap in the existing resource-conflict literature, the 
effect that private and state-ownership of resource extraction and has on the 
onset and severity of violence. This thesis provides a theoretical framework on 
how ownership of resources and violence are correlated, and tests what the 
relationship looks like. The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. First, I will 
review the existing literature on resources and conflict, and outline the gap 
where ownership of resources could play a crucial role in the correlating 
violence with natural resources. Second, I will outline established theories that 
explore the connections between resource extraction and violence; with 
particular emphasis on how private and state-owned resource extraction can 
incite different responses from potential rebel groups, depending on the 
opportunities and the feasibility of violence. Third, I will explain the research 
design and the methodological approach taken in this thesis. Fourth, I show the 
results of the analysis of new data on the ownership structure of natural 
resource extraction in Africa and Latin America from 1989-2014. My results 
suggest that when resource extraction is privately owned, the risk of higher 
levels of violence decreases, and when resource extraction is state-owned, the 
risk of higher levels of conflict increases. And Finally, I will discuss the implications 
of the results outlined in the analysis, and suggest areas for further research 
within the scope of ownership of resource extraction and how it can affect the 
level of violence states experience.  
  
	   8	  
2. Literature Review 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War signalled an opening up of national economies to the 
international economy, contributing to an increase in multinational 
corporations crossing borders in search of greater economic opportunities 
(O'Brien & Williams, 2010). Scholars have examined economic policies in regard 
to conflict risk, but generally limit these to discussions on agricultural resources 
or foreign aid. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in 
large foreign corporations participating in small economies. This implies a 
potential change in the dominant form of the ownership of natural resource 
extraction from state-owned to private; the implications of this for peace are 
not well known. The type of resource ownership is a section of the literature on 
natural resources and conflict that tends to get overlooked, particularly with 
regard to state-owned and privately owned mineral, oil and gas extraction, 
and how this may affect the severity of violence countries experience. 
 In this chapter I will outline the literature on natural resources and internal 
violent conflict. I have divided the literature into two main areas of research, 
the literature on natural resources and conflict, and the literature on political 
systems and conflict. Within the first group of literature I offer an overview of the 
evolution of resource-conflict as a whole. Second, I introduce the ‘resource 
curse’ and state capacity literature. Third, I discuss the literature on how 
different types of resources affect the onset and severity of violence. I then 
move on to discuss how governance and political structures affect the onset of 
conflict, with reference to the role of natural resources. Next in this section I will 
outline what has been said in the literature about the ownership of resource 
extraction. Finally, I review the literature on managing resources post-conflict. 
Each section will outline the main arguments from the resource-conflict 
literature in order to illustrate what has already been researched, and where 
there remains more research to be done. This chapter concludes that there is a 
gap in the research where the effect of the ownership of mineral and oil and 
gas extraction on the onset and severity of violence has not been thoroughly 
investigated. 
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Literature on Natural Resources and Conflict 
This section will outline the evolution of the resource-conflict literature. 
Beginning with the group of scholars who begun looking into the causes of 
conflict, and how natural resources emerged as a major contributor to contexts 
that breed violence. This section will move on to describing the resource curse, 
and how state capacity can create an environment where inequality is 
prevalent, and how this increases the likelihood of conflict. Finally in this section 
I will outline the literature on how resources can be used to finance wars based 
on the type of resource. This section of the literature review aims to provide a 
basic understanding of the developments of the literature on resource-conflicts 
and how resources and conflict intersect. This section will outline why resources 
are important when analysing conflict, and how resources can affect conflict 
onset and duration. 
The Evolution of the Resource-Conflict Literature 
The literature on conflict onset initially examined violent conflicts in general in 
an attempt to create a universal theory for conflict onset (Mac Ginty & Williams, 
2009). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) point out that there are many causes of 
conflict, and that ‘different factors will have different weight at different stages 
on a conflict trajectory’ (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). Furthermore, Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) provide an outline of their 
assessment of the causes of civil wars; they have categorised the causes of 
conflicts into political, social and economic factors, however these labels 
encompass a myriad of aspects that contribute to the risk of conflict onset in a 
given state (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  
A large proportion of the existing research on natural resources and conflict 
tends to take a political economy perspective. By examining economic factors 
and the type of political regime the conditions that characterise countries 
prone to conflict can be described (Indra De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; P Le 
Billon & Cervantes, 2012). Economic factors, for example, price volatility and 
the openness of the economy, can make conflict more likely in countries that 
rely on a single source of revenue, especially if the state has an authoritarian 
regime (Fjelde, 2009). If the price of exports drop and the government lacks an 
alternative source of income, it may struggle to provide basic needs for the 
population, which can result in an increased risk of conflict (Ogunleye, 2008). 
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However, ‘opinion is polarised on the role of economics in the outbreak of civil 
war’, whether it can play a saviour or villain role (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). 
Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) review the literature on political economy and 
conflict with the intention of illustrating the links between poverty, profit and 
conflict (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). They find that a complex mix of conditions 
contribute to the likelihood of conflict onset, conditions such as; the presence 
of resources, the pattern of resource exploitation, the perception of benefits of 
exploitation and identity affiliation (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). Blattman and 
Miguel (2010) add that the economic motivations for conflict have been better 
theorised than psychological and social factors that contribute to the conflict 
literature (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Economic factors are commonly used in 
the resource-conflict discourse because they are easier to define and measure, 
compared to psychological and social factors such as historical grievances 
and identity (Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014).  
The literature on natural resources and conflict is largely focused on the 
concept of the ‘resource curse’, its impact on the economic development of 
states and how this contributes to the risk of conflict. The resource curse 
argument suggests that states that are rich in natural resources are more prone 
to conflict because of uneven distribution of resource wealth, corrupt officials, 
and aggrieved citizens. Scholars, such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Le Billon 
(2012), Koubi and Bohmelt (2013), and Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) 
have identified a correlation between violent conflict and mineral resources 
and oil (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; V  Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; P Le Billon & 
Cervantes, 2012; P Lujala et al., 2005). There remains debate, however, over the 
theory and mechanisms that explain why rational actors are more likely to 
instigate violent conflict in states with natural resources. This thesis aims to 
review the existing theories and mechanisms that are introduced in the 
literature, and provide a critical examination of their power to effectively 
explain the link between conflict and natural resources. 
Rustad and Binningsbo (2012) argue that there are three mechanisms that link 
natural resources to conflict: distribution, finance and aggravation. The 
distribution mechanism refers to disagreements over the distribution of 
resources and wealth that may contribute to motivating rebellion (Rustad & 
Binningsbo, 2012). The financing mechanism identifies that resources can be 
used as a source of finance for conflict with flow on implications for conflict 
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onset. The aggravation mechanism refers to the argument that natural 
resources may aggravate existing conflict as either motivation or opportunity 
for rebellion, through mechanisms other than distributional claims or funding 
(Rustad & Binningsbo, 2012). Examples of these three mechanisms are illustrated 
in the conflict in the Niger Delta (Rustad & Binningsbo, 2012). For example, the 
Niger Delta experienced disagreements over the distribution of oil revenues; 
rebels ‘tapped into oil pipelines to finance violence’, and ‘environmental 
degradation created grievances’ and drove increased violence (Rustad & 
Binningsbo, 2012). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) also add that ‘violent conflict 
requires active instigation agents’ to encourage tensions to escalate into 
violence (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009).  
Resource Curse and State Capacity: 
The ‘resource curse’ argument emerged in the 1960s, when scholars were 
debating why some states were more prone to conflict than others (Luong & 
Weinthal, 2006). Scholars noted that developing and underdeveloped 
countries had more conflicts than developed countries, but many of these 
were also rich in resources, which should provide high levels of income (Welsch, 
2008). Scholars analysed the role of natural resource wealth and how this 
correlated to violent conflict. The resource curse can be summarised as the 
argument that natural resource wealth creates incentives for elites in 
developing states to create and maintain unrepresentative political systems 
while redistributing resource revenues unevenly. This creates both motivation 
and opportunities for armed conflict actors to form. De Soysa and Neumayer 
(2007) note that natural resources, instead of encouraging effective, efficient 
and competent government institutions, ‘foster corruption, patronage, and rent 
seeking behaviour’ from leaders (Indra De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007), which 
can lead to the state, and its control over revenue distribution, becoming a 
target for marginalised groups. 
Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) suggest that labour practices, distribution of 
licences and the destination of profits determine whether a resource rich state 
will suffer from violent conflict (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). They argue that it is 
a complex mix of the presence of resources, a pattern of resource exploitation, 
perception of the benefits of exploitation, and identity affiliation that determine 
the likelihood of the onset of violence (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). Mac Ginty 
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and Williams (2009) conclude that most civil wars take place in poor countries; 
arguing that poverty and inequality contribute to conflict, and that economic 
characteristics, such as low growth and dependency on resource revenue, 
predispose societies to civil war (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). Inequality is 
prominent in most resource rich nations as they often neglect, or lack, 
alternative revenue sources such as manufacturing or agriculture, in favour of 
resource revenue from mineral resources (Janus, 2012). Mac Ginty and Williams 
(2009) argue that if resource revenues are correctly managed, then they can 
have a positive effect on development, and therefore reduce the risk of 
conflict (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). Ogunleye (2008) highlights that resource 
rich nations, Nigeria in particular, have problems translating huge resource 
wealth into sustainable development, because of corruption, mismanagement 
of funds, and lack of alternative revenue sources (Ogunleye, 2008). These 
factors contribute to groups fighting over access to, and control of, resources 
and the subsequent revenue this produces (Rustad & Binningsbo, 2012).  
Wick and Bulte, (2006) and Welsch, (2008) discuss state capacity in relation to 
natural resources and the onset of violent conflict. They find that it is resource 
abundance linked with slow growth and poor institutions that can trigger 
conflict (Welsch, 2008; Wick & Bulte, 2006). The phrase ‘poor institutions’ 
describe institutions that lack accountability towards the population, and are 
often autocratic in nature, for example Nigeria, whose ‘successive military 
dictatorships have plundered oil wealth’ (van der Ploeg, 2011). Resources and 
their revenue, if used efficiently, have the potential of being an effective ‘driver 
for economic development’ (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Mac Ginty & 
Williams, 2009). However, the resource curse argument suggests that resource 
dependence engenders poor institutions. This, in turn, creates conditions where 
social and economic inequalities are exacerbated. Because the government 
does not rely on the citizens to keep them honest and accountable, instability 
and grievances grow, increasing the likelihood of violence and conflict 
(Basedau & Lay, 2009; Luong & Weinthal, 2006). Wick and Bulte (2006) argue 
that states often engage in activities that not only neglect other aspects of the 
economy, but also groups of people (Wick & Bulte, 2006). The presence of 
nepotism or patronage and corruption in resource rich states creates an 
uneven distribution of resource wealth, resulting in huge disparities between the 
ruling class and the working class, a common feature in conflict prone regions 
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(Welsch, 2008). Wick and Bulte (2006) add that states with an inability to 
effectively distribute wealth from resources, are likely to unevenly distribute 
other public goods, such as education and security (Wick & Bulte, 2006). De 
Soysa and Fjelde (2007) argue that factors, such as poorly developed 
infrastructure and unequal society, are prevalent in resource rich developing 
nations and therefore can provide an understanding for conflict onset (Indra 
De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007). 
Thies (2010) notes that reverse causality could play a role in the evaluation of 
the link between the onset of violence and natural resources (Thies, 2010). He 
argues that the onset of violence and civil war significantly reduces state 
capacity, because the state’s capabilities are redirected to fighting. In theory, 
natural resource rents might enhance state capacity, rather than increase the 
likelihood of civil war onset (Thies, 2010). States that have abundant natural 
resources, therefore, have a means for the government to strengthen its control 
on power through military spending (Thies, 2010). Strong institutions can provide 
the barrier for rebel groups to organise, as the revenue received from natural 
resource extraction can provide the means to maintain order (Snyder, 2006). 
Thies (2010) argues that states that are war prone might look resource 
dependent because other industries could have deserted, and the state is 
relying on natural resource revenue to keep the economy going (Thies, 2010). 
He finds evidence to this effect that contributes to our understanding of what 
happens to the resource economy as a result of conflict (Thies, 2010). 
Another aspect of the ‘resource curse’ involves the way in which resource 
revenues can create the state to be a ‘prize’, and make the capture of the 
state a target of rebels and marginalised groups (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010; 
Fjelde, 2009). Scholars argue that groups instigate rebellion in an attempt to 
either gain control of the state and control of resources, or to put enough 
pressure on the government, through fighting, to force the redistribution of 
resource wealth (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; V  Koubi & 
Bohmelt, 2013; Nillesen & Bulte, 2014; Welsch, 2008). The state’s bureaucratic 
machine is what controls and distributes the revenue raised from natural 
resource extraction (Fjelde, 2009; V Koubi, Spilker, Bohmelt, & Bernauer, 2013). 
Therefore, De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) and Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) 
argue that the more open and free the state’s bureaucracy and economy is, 
the less likely violence and civil war is to occur; because an open economy is 
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more accountable to its population, less available to rebel groups to be used 
as motivation for violence (Indra De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; Mac Ginty & 
Williams, 2009). 
Studies have found a correlation between the prevalence of corruption and 
violent conflict in resource rich nations arguing that the impact of corruption on 
economic performance results in political and socioeconomic breakdown and 
conflict (Wick & Bulte, 2006). Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that ‘outrage 
over inequality’ can act as prime motivation for engaging in violent action 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010). By favouring mineral and oil extraction over more 
inclusive and diverse industries, governments are limiting the opportunities of 
investing in jobs, education and development for the general population. 
Accompanied by prevalent inequality and corruption government’s have less 
motivation to build more accountable institutions and redistribute wealth fairly, 
creating grievances among the population (Wick & Bulte, 2006). 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) analyse the relationship between transparency and 
corruption in resource-rich countries, and argue that corruption is a huge 
problem that helps to explain why some countries suffer from poor socio-
economic development, and the onset of violence (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). They 
note the behaviour of political elites in resource rich nations reflects the level of 
transparency and access to information between government and resource 
extraction companies. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) discuss the implications of 
agents acting in corrupt ways to increase or maintain their own wealth, without 
caring about the welfare of the population (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). They argue 
that this creates relatively unstable societies with grievances against those in 
power acting corrupt (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Fjelde (2009) and Wick and Bulte 
(2006) state that resource rich governments that no longer rely on taxes from 
the population for revenue, have no need to be accountable to its citizens 
which in turn breeds corruption and inequality and closes off opportunities for 
non-violent and institutional forms of conflict resolution (Wick & Bulte, 2006).  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) find that corruption is prevalent in resource-rich 
developing countries because there is ‘ample space for bribes when the 
resource rents are huge’ (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Although, they conclude that 
transparency is not enough on its own to reduce the risk of violence, they 
suggest that good institutions - institutions that promote open and transparent 
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operations - can transform rents into favourable development outcomes, which 
in turn reduces the risk of violence (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Kolstad and Wiig 
(2009) analyse the impact that transparency and information capture can 
have on corrupt agents, and how this affects resource rents (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009). Agents, such as government officials, monitoring and evaluation officers, 
anyone employed or assigned to collect and report revenue for tax purposes, 
can choose to be corrupt or honest (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). This means that the 
agents can choose to misrepresent the revenue and take bribes to increase 
their income, or honestly report and receive a wage for their work (Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2009). Information capture refers to the control over the distribution of 
information usually accessible to all relevant stakeholders (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009).  
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) note that it pays to be corrupt when others are corrupt 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). They argue that it is in the interest of corrupt agents to 
control or capture information, in order to manipulate and influence political 
outcomes, if it could result in gains for themselves (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). They 
identify that information capture intensifies the ‘moral hazard problem’, 
because elected officials are more likely to engage in rent seeking in a non-
transparent environment, as they are less likely to get caught, and whoever 
controls the capture of information has a vested interest in corruption and the 
monetary rewards associated with it (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). In contrast, 
‘transparency reduces the possibilities of rent seeking activities and increases 
accountability of the government’ (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Widespread 
corruption can result in the failure of formal agreements where cooperation 
and honesty is needed to implement reforms, and instead, encourages 
opportunistic acts, such as looting and rent seeking, particularly in resource-rich 
developing states (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) explain that conflict risk, relative to natural 
resource wealth, reflects an inverted U shape. The richer the state, the more 
money the government can use to cement its monopoly on power, and has a 
greater ability to suppress rebellions and uprisings (Indra De Soysa & Neumayer, 
2007). Likewise, countries that are poor in resources are unlikely to experience 
conflict because there is little gain in initiating a war against a poor 
government (Collier et al., 2009). Whereas, countries that fall in the middle of 
the curve are more likely to experience conflict because the state is 
considered a feasible prize (Indra De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007). Additionally, 
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the government is unlikely to have the finances to compensate the rebels 
enough to deter conflict (V Koubi et al., 2013).  
Nillesen and Bulte (2014) analyse how resource revenue can both stabilise and 
de-stabilise a state, depending on the type of regime and its ability to access 
alternative revenue sources (Nillesen & Bulte, 2014). Basedau and Lay (2009) 
discuss how governments can use resource revenue to ‘buy off opposition or 
supress armed rebellion, thereby contributing to political stability and 
preventing armed conflict’ (Basedau & Lay, 2009, p. 758). They suggest that the 
effect that resource revenue has on the stability of the state depends on the 
strength of the state, as weak institutions assume an easy prize (Basedau & Lay, 
2009). The strength of states and their institutions are measured and defined by 
several indicators. Rice and Patrick (2008) define a weak state as a state that is 
‘unwilling or unable to provide essential public services, which include fostering 
equitable and sustainable economic growth, governing legitimately, ensuring 
physical security, and delivering basic services’ (Rice & Patrick, 2008). They use 
the following indicators, divided into economical, political, security and social 
welfare indicators, to measure state strength. The political indicators include; 
quality of institutions, degrees to which citizens accept the governance system 
as legitimate, measure of accountability, and the ability of the bureaucracy 
and institutions to function effectively, independently and responsively. The 
security indicators include; the occurrence and intensity of violent conflict and 
its residual effects, perceptions of political instability and sate sponsored 
political violence. Finally, the indicators of social welfare cover the ability of the 
state to meet the basic needs of citizens such as access to nutrition, health, 
education, water and sanitation (Rice & Patrick, 2008). Nillesen and Bulte (2014) 
add that strong institutions can result in a larger reward if rebel groups manage 
to overthrow the government because the revenues are managed better 
(Nillesen & Bulte, 2014). However, the stronger the state, the harder it is for rebel 
groups to win, because the state is likely to spend more money on an effective 
military apparatus, than weaker governments (Besley & Persson, 2010).  
Nillesen and Bulte (2014), Brunschweiler and Bulte (2009) and Wick and Bulte 
(2006) all note the importance of recognising reverse causality and spuriousness 
(Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Nillesen & Bulte, 2014; Wick & Bulte, 2006). The 
‘resource curse’ argument specifies that resource rich countries are prone to 
conflict because of political, economic and social consequences (instability, 
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poverty and inequality) that result from relying solely on resource revenue 
(Thies, 2010; Wick & Bulte, 2006). Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) argue that 
reverse causality may also play a vital role in the correlation between resource 
abundance and conflict, which can implicate conflict prone countries that 
discover resources (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009). Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore 
(2005) note that a ‘country suffering from low-level violence and political unrest 
may look more resource dependent as a consequence of instability’ (P Lujala 
et al., 2005). Lujala et al (2005) also note that a state may be more prone to 
conflict because of other ‘exogenous factors, such as famine or conflict in a 
neighbouring country’, and their effect on the economy, without affecting 
primary exports (P Lujala et al., 2005).  
Resource dependence is measured in different ways, most commonly through 
calculating the natural resource wealth of a state compared to alternative 
revenue. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) measure the primary commodity exports as 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), suggesting that when one 
third of GDP is from primary commodity exports, there is a high risk of civil war 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Alternatively, De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) measure 
the value of natural resource extraction through unit rent, which is calculated 
by subtracting the cost of extraction from the world price of the resource, 
multiplied by the amount extracted, and then divide this by Gross National 
Income (GNI) (Indra De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
look at dependence through exports and how reliant a state may be on 
natural resource exports, whereas De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) look at how 
much of a states income originates from resource extraction – the value of 
resource extraction versus the value of exporting natural resources. 
Blattman and Miguel (2010) conclude that ‘civil war is more likely when state 
wealth is easily appropriated or divorced from the citizenry’, which is common 
with highly corrupt governments (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). When government 
officials are corrupt, they will do everything within their power to maintain their 
status and position, including eliminating time limits to their terms, nepotism and 
weakening the political opposition (Bates, Greif, & Singh, 2002; Fjelde, 2009). 
Activities like these were prevalent during the Cold War, but were most active 
following the end of the Cold War, as the alliances and international divisions 
dissipated, and poor countries could no longer rely on the east and west divide 
to pressure the powers for support. As a result of the end of the Cold War, there 
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was a withdrawal of economic support for developing countries; this was 
particularly detrimental for resource rich states that were plagued by corruption 
(Reno, 1997). The affected countries were forced to find other sources of 
income for development, forcing them towards resource dependence, instead 
of the aid they were receiving throughout the Cold War.  
Blattman and Miguel (2010) cite William Reno’s (1999) argument that 
‘strongmen found it optimal to deinstitutionalise the state and the formal 
bureaucratic mechanisms in favour of a parallel “shadow state” under their 
own control’ (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Reno, 1999). Reno (1999) argues that 
“warlord states” were a result of the presence of resource wealth and pressures 
for economic liberalisation (Reno, 1999). This poses a puzzle in the literature, as 
Reno (1999) is arguing that economic liberalisation drove “warlord states” and 
“shadow states” (Reno, 1999). The puzzle here is that Reno (1999) is suggesting 
that the combination of liberalisation and resources might induce conflict, 
whilst others, such as De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) suggest that liberalisation is, in 
general, peace inducing (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010; Reno, 1999). 
Resources Wars and Financing Conflict 
It is important to note that there is a difference between ‘resource wars’ and 
the ‘resource curse’. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) define resource wars as a 
conflict where both the rebels and the government forces are financed by the 
exploitation of natural resources (Guidolin & La Ferrar, 2007). Therefore, 
resource wars define the type of conflict funding, whereas the term resource 
curse refers to the way in which natural resource wealth creates structural 
conditions that are conducive to armed conflict. Fjelde (2009) and Ross (2004) 
argue that rebel groups utilise natural resources because they are easy to 
control and defend during conflict, and provide sufficient funding opportunities 
for rebels (Fjelde, 2009; M. L. Ross, 2004). Specifically, ‘lootable’ resources 
increase the risk of violent conflict, because they are easy to access and 
control (Basedau & Lay, 2009; V  Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Rustad & Binningsbo, 
2012; Welsch, 2008; Wick & Bulte, 2006). Fjelde (2009) notes that different 
resources influence conflict differently; for example, oil rich countries are more 
likely to experience coups and fighting for state power in order to gain control 
over the resource revenue (Fjelde, 2009). Countries with an abundance of 
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alluvial diamonds are more likely to experience territorial conflict, fighting for 
control of land and access to resource extraction (M. Ross, 2006).  
Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) argue that lootable resources are more 
likely to have an effect on the onset of conflict because they provide a 
financial opportunity for rebels to initiate violence (P Lujala et al., 2005). In 
addition, Le Billon and Cervantes (2012) suggest that geological formation and 
geographical location help determine the effect that natural resources have 
on conflict (P Le Billon & Cervantes, 2012). Le Billon (2012) argues that point 
resources located close to the central government are likely to encourage 
conflicts over state control or coups, whereas, if they are further away from the 
central government, they are likely to result in the initiation of a secessionist 
conflict, as illustrated in Table 1 (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). Point resources are 
resources that are geographically concentrated, high value, and require 
capital-intensive extraction methods, such as oil, gas, primary gemstones and 
some minerals. The geographic concentration of these resources is often 
referred to playing a key role in secessionist movements or conflict over 
government rule. For example in the Republic of Congo, offshore oil wealth was 
appropriated by incumbent rulers, exacerbating societal divisions and 
contributing to conflict recurrence (Englebert & Ron, 2004; Philippe Le Billon, 
2011). Conversely, diffuse resources, resources that are not concentrated to 
one location, such as alluvial gold and diamonds, are often connected with 
countries that experience rebellion or warlordism, where a de facto state is 
imposed through violence and criminal activity (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). 
Specifically, Sierra Leone and conflict diamonds is the most commonly used 
example because of the extent that the diamonds played in the conflict and 
international policy at the time; these diamonds were diffuse and easy to 
exploit (M. Ross, 2006). 
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Table 2-1 Le Billon Table (Philippe Le Billon, 2011) 
 Point Diffuse 
Proximate Coup d’état Mass 
Rebellion 
Distant Secession Warlordism 
Janus (2012) finds a positive connection between mineral resources and 
conflict onset and duration, suggesting that different groups - governments, 
military, and rebel groups - are likely to use revenue from natural resources as a 
source of finance for conflict (Janus, 2012). Revenues from natural resources 
can be utilised by both the state and other fighting parties for conflict. The state 
can use the revenue from resource exports to finance the military, hiring more 
full-time soldiers, and to purchase weapons, uniforms, vehicles and fuel (Janus, 
2012). Rebel groups can use lootable resources to pay for soldiers and 
weapons, but cannot access larger revenues because they are controlled by 
the state (P Lujala et al., 2005). Janus (2012) and de Soysa and Fjelde (2010) 
mention the challenge of costs for rebel groups, because they do not have the 
monopoly on violence like the state, and they may struggle to find financial 
sources (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010). Resources, therefore, can play a vital role in 
rebels’ decision to fight, depending on the availability of and access to easily 
lootable resources. Janus (2012) also discusses the potential for rebel groups to 
borrow against future earnings, by promising to pay soldiers once they win by 
achieving their intended goal (Janus, 2012). For example, if alluvial diamonds 
are present, they can fight for control of the diamond fields and then use the 
revenue to pay their soldiers (Janus, 2012). Janus (2012) uses alluvial diamonds 
in this example, because they are easy to access, defend and sell (Janus, 
2012).  
Furthermore, Fjelde (2009), Ross (2004) and Welsch (2008) argue that less 
capital-intensive resources are likely to be used by rebels during conflict, as 
opposed to resources that require capital-intensive infrastructure and 
knowledge to extract (Fjelde, 2009; M. Ross, 2006; Welsch, 2008). However, the 
discussion is limited to lootable versus non-lootable and does not explore the 
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type of extraction companies involved in capital-intensive extraction. These 
scholars reaffirm the importance of looking at the physical configuration of 
resources, and the political and economic environment that surround resource 
extraction (Welsch, 2008) (P Lujala et al., 2005).  
Additionally, Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Bell and Wolford (2015) analyse the 
relationship between oil discovery and the onset of conflict (Bell & Wolford, 
2015; Cotet & Tsui, 2013). They outline the potential of future wealth, and the 
ability of groups to use that wealth to influence their bargaining power (Bell & 
Wolford, 2015; Cotet & Tsui, 2013). Cotet and Tsui (2013) find little robust 
evidence to connect oil discoveries to conflict onset, however they do 
conclude that there is a relationship between oil discoveries and an increase in 
military spending, especially in non-democratic countries (Cotet & Tsui, 2013). 
Bell and Wolford, in their 2015 study, develop the relationship between oil 
discoveries and conflict further, and find that a stronger relationship exists 
between oil discoveries and violence in less wealthy states (Bell & Wolford, 
2015). Bell and Wolford (2015) outline that new discoveries ‘create a window of 
opportunity for rebels’ to challenge the government, before they are able to 
realise the revenues from oil discovery and the power ‘shifts even further in the 
government’s favour’ (Bell & Wolford, 2015). They suggest from their findings 
that powerful states will be more resistant to changes as a result of oil discovery, 
and the future profits, which will act as a deterrent for rebels to initiate conflict 
(Bell & Wolford, 2015). Alternatively, they argue that weak states are less likely to 
be able to deter challenges from outside the government following discovery 
(Bell & Wolford, 2015). Additionally, Cotet and Tsui (2013) suggest that a non-
democratic state is more likely to increase military spending following the 
discovery of oil, which increases the costs for potential rebels, preventing rival 
groups from seizing power and control of the oil revenue (Cotet & Tsui, 2013). 
De Soysa and Fjelde investigate the relative ‘payoffs to be gained from 
production and resource appropriation’ (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010, p. 291). They 
suggest that fighting groups will only instigate violence if the opportunity costs 
are attractive. Opportunity costs refer to the relative, rather than absolute, costs 
associated with initiating a conflict (Welsch, 2008). This is similar to feasibility 
theory, which will be discussed further in the theory chapter. Feasibility theory 
suggests that fighters are rational actors that calculate the likelihood of 
success, consider the costs and benefits of instigating violence, and if 
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conditions are favourable, they will fight (Collier et al., 2009). Koubi et al (2013), 
and Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) argue that opportunity or greed can play 
an underlying role in sustaining conflict, but that grievances are often the face 
of the rebellion (V Koubi et al., 2013; Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). They argue 
that people are more likely to join a rebel movement if they are fighting for the 
return of something that historically belonged to the local community, such as 
land, money and/or resources (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). As opposed to 
fighting because they want, or there is an opportunity to gain, access to 
resources and their revenue (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009).  
Literature on Political Systems and Conflict 
In this section I will outline the literature on political systems, the governance of 
natural resources, and conflict. This portion of the literature review aims to show 
how resource-conflict scholars have analysed aspects of resource extraction 
that impact the likelihood of conflict, and how the ownership of resource 
extraction is a part of this dynamic. Although there is a growing branch of 
scholarship within the field of resource-conflicts that has been researching the 
ownership of resource extraction and its impact on conflict, there is still a gap in 
the research for this thesis to address. The gap in this part of the research is 
centred on the type of resources, and the method of measuring ownership. 
First, I will discuss how political and economic systems govern natural resources, 
and what impact the governance has on the likelihood of conflict. Second, I 
will discuss the literature that has touched on the ownership of resource 
extraction and its impact on conflict. I will conclude this section with a brief 
discussion of a portion of the literature that discusses the management of 
natural resources in post-conflict situations, in order to prevent the recurrence 
of conflict. 
Governance of Resource Extraction 
De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) discuss the impact of economic systems and assert 
that this is a better measure and predictor of conflict onset than regime type (I 
de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010). They suggest that open and free economies are less 
likely to encourage ‘illegal’ behaviour, and therefore, less prone to conflict (I de 
Soysa & Fjelde, 2010). They argue that, because the state is not heavily involved 
in the economy, the state is no longer perceived as a prize for rebel groups to 
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gain control over, because it will not enable rebels to accumulate resources or 
the benefits of rebellion. ‘States that have an economic system favouring 
private commercial interests and thereby lower involvement of the state in the 
economy show a lower risk of conflict’ (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010, p. 296). 
Instead, it is the private companies/parties that participate in the economy that 
would be perceived as the threat to community wellbeing and development, if 
they were seen to be contributing to inequalities (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010; 
Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009).  
Following the end of the Cold War, states were encouraged to adopt 
neoliberal policies to deregulate their economies in order to encourage foreign 
direct investment and promote growth (Acuña, 2015). Due to deregulation and 
slow development rates, states experienced increased competition to entice 
private corporations and investments to their territories. The resulting 
concessions relinquished development obligations and overlooked mineral laws 
that required a percentage of state ownership (Gomez & Sawyers, 2012). 
Governments’ attempts to encourage private investment in the mineral 
industry, by removing the barriers of social corporate responsibility, can result in 
aggrieved local populations and therefore increase the likelihood of violent 
conflict. The promised benefits to the community, such as job creation, 
community development and building infrastructure, often lose momentum 
and fail (Gomez & Sawyers, 2012). The economic growth associated with 
increased resource extraction carries costs as a result of dispossession felt by 
indigenous peoples (Acuña, 2015). Le Billon (2011) argues that these 
characteristics ‘provide a context for political mobilisation’ by the local 
community suffering from a lack of development while the government or 
extraction company reaps the benefits of their land (Philippe Le Billon, 2011).  
Acuna (2015) discusses the role of extractive governance with reference to 
Peru and the Baguazo conflict as his case study (Acuña, 2015). He argues that 
the pressure, during the 1990s, for Peru to adopt neoliberal policies encouraged 
an influx in mining concessions, which contributed to the increased number of 
social conflicts (Acuña, 2015). Acuna (2015) highlights the numbers of recorded 
social conflicts, in particular those labelled as ‘socio-environmental conflicts’, 
which refer to conflicts between people and their environment (Acuña, 2015). 
Acuna (2015) notes that many of the socio-environmental conflicts show 
resistance to the dispossession processes of extractive industries, for example, 
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the dispossession of resources such as water or grazing lands, or the 
‘dispossession of health in the case of the lead mining company, Doe Run in La 
Oroya’ (Acuña, 2015).  
Ownership of Resource Extraction 
The relationship between the state and resource extraction companies is 
focused on profit margins, and tends to overlook the rights of indigenous 
populations (Zandvliet, 2005). Particularly, formerly colonial states, where 
indigenous groups have a history of marginalisation, discrimination and 
exclusion, it is argued these communities are more likely to experience conflict 
(Altman, 2012). Acuna (2015) argues that colonial legacies are entrenched in 
the ill-designed policies of former colonies, through patterns of domination that 
deny indigenous ontologies (Acuña, 2015). Acuna (2015) suggests that the lack 
of respect for the beliefs and rights of indigenous people is historically 
entrenched in society and this is reflected in policy that marginalises their 
position in the eyes of the law.   
Additionally, Sawyers and Gomez (2012) outline that indigenous groups are 
fighting for land rights in order to guide the interactions with resource extraction 
companies working in their territory (Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). They suggest that 
indigenous groups fight to protect the rights to their land and their right to 
financial compensation (Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). They note that the laws for 
indigenous rights first need to define who is recognised as indigenous and as 
rights bearing subjects (Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). Once land rights are claimed 
and legitimised, they then have a legal voice in the discussion between 
extraction companies and the government, however, this can be empowering 
or debilitating, depending on the cohesiveness of the indigenous groups 
(Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). Sawyers and Gomez (2012) suggest that indigenous 
groups that do not have legal rights to their lands may fight to gain these rights 
(Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014), argue that 
this situation can lead to violent civil war if the indigenous group and their 
grievances are not heard (Buhaug et al., 2014). Additionally, Asal, Findley 
Piazza and Walsh argue that excluded ethnic groups are more likely to 
experience conflict when oil wealth is in their territory (Asal, Findley, Piazza, & 
Walsh, 2015). Acuna (2015) adds that the process can be hindered by 
governments changing policies without consulting the indigenous communities 
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who were party to the initial agreement in favour of pursuing economic 
interests (Acuña, 2015). 
The balance between recognising and respecting indigenous rights in a 
resource rich nation needs further attention to ensure that the interactions 
between multinational corporations, governments and indigenous people are 
conducive to peaceful mutually beneficial relations (Acuña, 2015; Sawyers & 
Gomez, 2012). Sawyers and Gomez (2012) conclude that there is a paradox of 
increasing international and national legal instruments recognising the legal 
rights of indigenous peoples, however there is also an increase in the 
marginalisation of the majority of indigenous peoples (Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). 
They note that ‘the paradox calls for greater analysis of regimes of power at 
play under processes of neoliberal reform and heightened capital-intensive 
resource extraction’ (Sawyers & Gomez, 2012). This suggests that there is a 
connection between the power of state regimes, marginalised groups and 
mineral extraction companies, and that rifts between these groups could lead 
to violence. 
Ogunleye (2008) discusses alternative methods of fighting poor governance of 
resource extraction and prevalent corruption in Nigeria (Ogunleye, 2008). In 
Nigeria, rebel groups target and attack the infrastructure of resource 
extraction, sabotaging and tapping into oil pipelines, instead of fighting the 
government, in an attempt to redirect and gain control over the resource 
revenue (Ogunleye, 2008). Boege and Franks (2012) outline how rebel groups 
design attacks on extraction infrastructure in an attempt to alter the behaviour 
of extraction companies with reference to the Bougainville conflict in Papua 
New Guinea in the late 1980s (Boege & Franks, 2012). Sabotaging the 
infrastructure of resource extraction companies has been described as an 
alternative to looting for capital-intensive resources, as was seen in Bougainville 
at the Panguna Mine, and in the Niger Delta (Boege & Franks, 2012; Ogunleye, 
2008).  
Capital-intensive natural resources are location specific; therefore, companies 
working with these resources are limited in their actions, because they cannot 
easily relocate like manufacturing and production companies, should conflict 
occur in the area (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). Conversely, rebel groups cannot 
easily use point resources to finance their efforts because they often do not 
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have the knowledge of extraction processes, nor can they easily afford the 
cost of extraction (P Lujala et al., 2005). The type of resources present in a state 
and the subsequent extraction companies, therefore, will have an impact on 
the decisions of rebels to initiate conflict or not.  
Tim Wegenast (2015) investigated the effect of ownership structure of oil and 
natural gas on intrastate conflict, and found that countries with state-owned oil 
and gas extraction tend to have a curvilinear relationship with intrastate 
conflicts (T. Wegenast, 2015). In other words, Wegenast (2015) found that when 
state-owned oil and gas production is at both high and low levels conflict is less 
likely than medium levels of production (T. Wegenast, 2015). Wegenast (2015) 
also noted that the greed and grievance mechanisms were more pronounced 
in countries with state-owned oil and gas extraction (T. Wegenast, 2015). 
Wegenast (2015) suggests that state-owned oil and gas extraction encourages 
corruption, patronage and other peace-buying practices (T. Wegenast, 2015). 
The results from Wegenast’s work compliments the work of the likes of Fjelde 
(2009), Mahler (2011), Basedau and Lay (2009), Rustad, Lujala and Le Billon 
(2012) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) who all touch on the power of oil 
wealth in the hands of corrupt government officials and their ability to buy 
peace (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Fjelde, 2009; Mahler, 
2011; Rustad, Lujala, & Le Billon, 2012). 
Additionally, conflict entrepreneurs may find that pre-conflict conditions 
provide the perfect scenario to align themselves with businesses that extract 
minerals (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). In other words, the entrepreneurs could 
conduct a deal with an extraction company to provide security to protect the 
company if conflict should occur, or, alternatively, could make conflict less 
likely. This corrupt activity would cement the conflict entrepreneur’s position 
with the company and ensure an uninterrupted flow of revenue (Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2009). Le Billon (2012) discusses this idea but limits the scope to diffuse 
resources, with his theory that if the resources are located further from central 
government then warlordism is the most likely to occur, because it is the most 
financially viable option (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). However, the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative and Corporate Social Responsibility were measures 
introduced by the international community to combat the illicit activity 
between corporations, governments and conflict entrepreneurs (Altman, 2012; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Sawyers & Gomez, 2012; Wiig & Kolstad, 2012). In 
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particular, Corporate Social Responsibility was introduced in an attempt to 
improve the accountability of multinational corporations and their impact on 
local communities where they work (Altman, 2012; Wiig & Kolstad, 2012). 
Gomez and Sawyers (2012) argue that since the introduction of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, the view of resource extraction companies has not 
improved in many places due to the power of neoliberal economic policies 
and the lack of accountability due to self-regulatory monitoring mechanisms 
(Gomez & Sawyers, 2012). 
The current economic system and the widespread reliance on oil and mineral 
resources for consumerism mean that there will always be a strong demand for 
natural resources for the foreseeable future. Le Billon (2012) notes the role of 
international interventions into countries with ‘strategic resources’ experiencing 
conflict (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). Le Billon (2012) suggests that the interventions 
into resource-rich, conflict-plagued regions are often to protect strategic 
resources from the effects of conflict, largely through manipulation of leaders 
and support for secession movements to enable continued and favourable 
access to resources (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). The great consumer demand for 
natural resources brings together complexes of private companies and state 
bodies to ‘create an oasis of petrochemical calm in the midst of wider conflict’, 
just to ensure that access to natural resources is unrestricted (Mac Ginty & 
Williams, 2009). The behaviour described by Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) and 
Le Billon (2012) suggests that continued research into the relationship between 
resources and conflict is still valuable, and there are still gaps in the scholarship; 
this thesis aims to address the gap of the effect that ownership of resource 
extraction has on the severity of violence. 
Resource Extraction and Post-Conflict Recurrence: 
A large part of the literature looks at the affect of natural resources during post-
conflict times, as well as the duration and intensity of conflict. However, the 
post-conflict literature can also apply to the onset of conflict, as it discusses 
how resources can create conditions that make it feasible for groups to return 
to arms and therefore initiate conflict (I de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010, p. 287). Boege 
and Franks (2012) discuss the reopening of mines in post-conflict time, in relation 
to Bougainville and Guatemala, and how the grievances present in the 
communities could contribute to them using the resource extraction to either 
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hurt the government or use to fund more conflict. Rustad and Binningsbo (2012) 
note that peace depends on whether ‘natural resources can constitute a 
motive or opportunity for armed conflict’ (Rustad & Binningsbo, 2012), they 
discuss this in relation to conflict recurrence also. Rustad and Binningsbo (2012) 
discuss conflict recurrence with respect to three mechanisms; distribution, 
finance and aggravation, these are three aspects of resource conflicts that 
also apply to conflict onset, which can explain the logic behind rebel groups 
deciding to instigate conflict, as well as, return to conflict. 
The relationships between companies, communities and government in post-
conflict resource rich countries, suggest that the aspects for conflict recurrence 
could be influential in predicting conflict. Boege and Franks (2012) note the 
‘challenge of company-community relations’ and how the parties go about 
mending differences to ensure peace in post-conflict times (Boege & Franks, 
2012). They discuss how to ensure all parties involved or affected by resource 
extraction all play a part in the negotiation of reopening a mine (Boege & 
Franks, 2012). Boege and Franks (2012) argue that if the resource extraction 
company played a role in the conflict, then it is more beneficial to include 
community groups and their leaders in the negotiations before reopening the 
mine post-conflict to promote reconciliation (Boege & Franks, 2012). It is 
plausible to think then, that these actions would be beneficial when 
establishing a mining operation in any developing nation, particularly if they 
have experienced conflict. Boege and Franks (2012) also demonstrate the 
implications of setting up new mining operations in a post-conflict zone with 
reference to companies participating in rebuilding and engaging in ‘conflict-
sensitive community relations practices’, particularly in Guatemala (Boege & 
Franks, 2012, p. 113).  
Boege and Franks (2012) find that the role of mining companies is important in 
guiding and building effective relationships between local communities, and 
government in post-conflict situations, because it is a sensitive period where 
reconciliation is priority for all parties affected by conflict (Boege & Franks, 
2012). Additionally, in regions that are further from central government, or 
where the government is weak, Boege and Franks (2012) emphasise the 
importance of companies to work with the local community, and government 
to establish effective institutions and involve the community through creating 
jobs in extraction and building infrastructure (Boege & Franks, 2012). By 
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participating in these processes, it is possible that companies can contribute to 
maintaining the peace and building resilient communities by improving 
transparency, minimising grievances, and abiding by their corporate social 
responsibility (Boege & Franks, 2012).  
Summary of Literature: 
Ultimately, the debate around the impact that extraction of natural resources 
has on violence is centred on the puzzle introduced in this chapter; that 
resources can act as both a stabilising and a destabilising force for states, 
depending on how the resources are managed. This chapter has outlined the 
main arguments in the literature on conflict onset and resource extraction. I 
have explored ideas of the resource curse, and the implications of slow 
development, poor policy and weak institutional capacity in resource rich 
countries. Scholars looking to explain why conflicts occur in resource rich 
nations have narrowed the scope down to three main contexts that imply a 
higher risk of violence and conflict for resource rich countries. The first context is 
a state’s ability to effectively redistribute revenue and build capacity. The 
second context is the ability of rebels to use resources to finance conflict. And 
thirdly, the governance of resource extraction as a product of international 
economic trends, such as increasing privatisation and deregulation of 
economic actors like mining companies, with the ownership of resource 
extraction and post-conflict recurrence adding further understanding to the 
conditions that make picking up arms feasible. 
Scholars find that the ability of the state to redistribute resource revenue plays a 
role in whether a state will be more prone to conflict onset. Countries that 
experience slow economic growth and are dependent on a single source for 
earning government income, for example natural resources, are likely to have 
a poorly built state capacity/bureaucratic apparatus that resorts to corruption 
and nepotism for the distribution of resource revenue. De Soysa and Fjelde 
(2010) argue that people are more likely to vote for an incorrupt government 
because it will operate through open and honest trade deals where the 
income can be transferred to sustainable economic development (I de Soysa 
& Fjelde, 2010). Additionally, these countries are less likely to have corrupt 
officials, and as a result, less likely to have created an environment where 
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people feel that the costs of fighting for fairer distribution of resources are better 
than the status quo. 
The type of resource has been shown to matter when it comes to the onset of 
violence, as the type of resource, point or diffuse, determines how it is likely to 
be extracted and therefore, how potential rebel groups can use is the resource 
in conflict. The more lootable a resource is, the more likely it will be used to 
finance a rebellion, whereas, more capital intensive resources are likely to 
entice rebels to fight/attack the state or resource infrastructure, depending on 
which is option is more feasible.  Additionally, Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Bell and 
Wolford (2015) discussed the implications of the discovery of resources, 
particularly in states where the likelihood of future repression is high, therefore 
making rebellion more feasible than fighting once the state is receiving 
revenue, and has the ability to increase their capacity to stop rebellion (Bell & 
Wolford, 2015; Cotet & Tsui, 2013). 
Resource wars, resource dependence and conflict over control and access to 
resources have become more predominant following changes to the 
international economic environment and pressure for liberal policies in 
developing countries. Participation of multinational corporations in weaker 
national economies increased following the end of the Cold War. Economic 
pressures, in addition to lack of recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights, 
colonial legacies, and lack of state capacity/knowledge could contribute to 
conditions where conflict entrepreneurs find it more beneficial to take up arms, 
as opposed to joining more peaceful means, to bring about social and 
institutional change.  
This chapter has outlined the arguments from the main scholars who have 
produced work on natural resources and conflict onset. The literature reviewed 
in this chapter has shown that resources can have an affect on the conditions 
that foster rebellion and violence. Additionally, this chapter has shown that 
economic factors and actors play an important role in how a population 
perceives the value of natural resources and how the state redistributes that 
value. There is a small branch of the resource-conflict field of research that 
touches on the ownership of resources and its impact of conflict is restricted in 
its approach to investigate the effects of ownership. This portion of research 
only incorporates oil and gas extraction, and as a result, fails to show how much 
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ownership of resource extraction can affect the onset and severity of violent 
conflict. In particular, whether the effects change depending on the type of 
resource being extracted, and for other methods of measurement. This thesis 
aims to address this gap in the research by providing some insight into the 
effect that the ownership of resource extraction has on the onset and severity 
of violent conflict. In the next chapter I will outline and discuss the arguments 
that explain what motivates people/groups to initiate violent conflict, and link 
these mechanisms to variations in whether resources are extracted by private 
or a state-owned companies.  
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3. Theory 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the main arguments from the literature on 
natural resources and violent conflict onset. In this section I will further explain 
how different types of ownership may affect conflict onset differently. 
Additionally, I will identify how low-level violence and high-level violence are 
linked to the presence of private and state-owned natural resource extraction 
companies respectively. I derive an integration of theories that will provide 
insight into what conditions drive groups to instigate violence and whether high 
or low level violence is the most efficient and feasible option, based on the 
anticipated response from the government and the resource extraction 
company. First, I posit that when resource extraction is privately owned, there is 
more incentive to negotiate and avoid violence. Therefore, potential rebel 
groups are more likely to use tactics in line with low-level violence. Second, I 
posit that when resource extraction is state-owned, potential rebel groups will 
anticipate that the government will be more likely to use severe repression to 
end further disruptions to production. As a result, only strong rebel groups will 
initiate violence, or groups will wait until they have the capabilities to launch a 
rebellion, and other methods of high-level violence. Consequently, the use of 
high-level violence may lead to longer conflicts and civil war, due to the 
likelihood of the military becoming involved, whereas low-level violence will 
most likely be resolved quickly by way of negotiations and concessions with 
potential rebel groups. 
The majority of the research on natural resources and conflict has been limited 
to the effect of oil, gas and precious gemstones on conflict onset. This research 
will look at exploited mineral and fuel resources1 and how they impact the 
severity of violence used. This chapter will begin by outlining the common 
theories used by natural resource conflict scholars to explain the link between 
natural resources and conflict onset, and, the opportunities and conditions that 
enable mobilisation and financing for rebellions to occur. Second, I will outline 
the main argument of this chapter by discussing the hybrid theory used in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The types of natural resources included in this study are defined in the method’s chapter. 
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thesis that provides the best theoretical explanation for why potential rebel 
groups will instigate violence when resource extraction is present. Then I will go 
on to outline the causal story of how the ownership of resource extraction can 
affect the anticipated onset and level of violence differently.  
Conflict onset can be understood as caused by factors that stress grievances 
and factors that stress opportunities, but recent research has begun the process 
of integrating these two, and that one is not complete without the other 
(Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013a; Regan & Norton, 2005; Walter, 2012). 
For that reason, this thesis argues that groups will take into account the type of 
extraction company, the type of government, and anticipate the appropriate 
level of violence it will take to succeed without the high costs normally 
associated with rebellions. A narrative within conflict literature argues that 
groups of the population may feel overlooked through the process of setting up 
resource extraction operations. For example, indigenous groups may feel 
marginalised in society with have historical ties to the land, and their 
participation may be overlooked throughout the negotiation stages of setting 
up extraction projects. Therefore, these groups may feel that they are not 
receiving their share of the profits, and/or see their land being destroyed for the 
profit of the company and the government. As a result, these groups may want 
to fight for recognition of their rights, and may escalate that fight for control of 
the resources in order to more effectively distribute resources. Most studies of 
conflict onset and natural resource extraction argue that there is a causal 
relationship between natural resource extraction and the onset of violence.  
Common Theories 
The main theories proposed in the literature on natural resources and violent 
conflict relate to (1) grievances that encourage groups to mobilise, and (2) the 
opportunities for success that facilitate rebellion. In the civil war literature, 
conditions such as a lack of development, ethnic fractionalisation, and 
inequalities, are commonly argued to be key factors determining the likelihood 
of conflict occurring in a particular state (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Mahler, 2011). 
For conflict to occur, movements need motive, opportunity, popular support, 
and capability (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 
(2013) note that the ‘the struggle of discriminated and stateless people’ cause 
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civil wars, as it is difficult to sustain regimes that exclude large sections of the 
population from participating in political power along ethnic or non-ethnic lines 
(Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013d). Additionally, Asal, Findley, Piazza and 
Walsh (2015) argue that excluded ethnic groups, who have oil wealth within 
their settlement area, are more likely to experience the onset of armed conflict, 
as opposed to similar groups who do not possess land rich in natural resources 
(Asal et al., 2015). In Cederman et al.’s (2013) book, they argue that grievances 
provide motivation for the onset of violence, and outline the critiques of the 
theory, including Meuller’s (2000) argument that grievances are ‘an 
opportunistic cover for greedy and even criminal activities’ (Cederman et al., 
2013d). Walter (2012) adds that ‘some wars may occur simply because groups 
can profit from various forms of resource extraction or illicit activities during war’ 
(Walter, 2012). 
This section aims to provide some basic explanations of the two main theories 
that effectively communicate how rebel mobilisation and the onset of violence 
occur in states with natural resources. First I will explain grievance theory, 
followed by opportunity theory, separately. By exploring these theories on their 
own I will outline their strengths and weaknesses in explaining resource-conflicts. 
I will then explain the main argument of this thesis, and how the two theories, 
grievance and opportunity, work together as a hybrid theory, that can provide 
an effective explanation of how the different ownership structures, private and 
state-owned resource extraction, can determine the severity of violence states 
are likely to experience,  
Grievance 
Grievance theory evolved from theories of relative deprivation and revolution, 
developed by Ted Robert Gurr (1970) and James C. Davies (1962) (Davies, 
1962; Gurr, 1970). Cederman, Gledistch and Buhaug (2013) outline the main 
arguments from Davies and Gurr to illustrate the link from inequality and 
grievances to civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013c). They note that 
‘relative deprivation theorists argue that individuals widespread discontent with 
their social situation triggers conflict, especially where modernisation fuels a 
“revolution of rising expectation” (Davies 1962)’ (Cederman et al., 2013c; 
Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Cederman et al. find that structural imbalances in 
society, such as inequality, can be linked with conflict through relative 
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deprivation theory. Cederman et al. (2013), along with other scholars of 
collective violence and conflict onset, suggest that these theories provide 
explanations to the psychological mechanisms that drive groups decisions to 
fight when they perceive inequalities, or ‘unfulfilled aspirations, usually related 
to material wellbeing’, between and among groups of society (Cederman et 
al., 2013c; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970).  
Perceived inequalities, or grievances, are commonly argued to be one of the 
main causes of conflict.  Perceived inequalities arise when a state is seen to 
have failed at effectively protecting and supporting a section of the population 
(Cederman et al., 2013c). This is common within resource rich countries with a 
history of exclusionary policies from the government (Asal et al., 2015; T. C. 
Wegenast & Basedau, 2014). The role of the state is to distribute social goods to 
the people and Cederman et al. (2013) argue that when the government acts 
in the self-interest of profit for a subsection of society, they do not effectively 
redistribute wealth, resulting in inequalities (Cederman et al., 2013c). 
Consequently, people who perceive inequalities between themselves and 
other privileged groups can use the differences as a trigger for mobilisation to 
fight to change the status quo (Cederman et al., 2013c). Regan and Norton 
(2005) argue that inequality causes internal dissent and revolution resulting in a 
rebellion fuelled by movements in perceived deprivation (Regan & Norton, 
2005).  
Grievances are a collectivist strategy of conflict, where people fight to correct 
injustices afflicting entire groups along ethnic, regional, or economic lines 
(Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013b; Cederman et al., 2013d). For groups 
to mobilise and fight, they need to identify with, or be perceived as part of the 
aggrieved population - for example ethnic groups that have long been 
ignored or marginalised through colonisation and continued exclusion following 
independence (Cederman et al., 2013c). Violence and repression can also 
accelerate identity formation, and mass mobilisation against the state, as 
people will see friends and family, or themselves, as the victims of unjustified 
violence from the state (Cederman et al., 2013b). 
Grievances often have strong historical roots, countries that have had a long 
colonial history, and a history of violence and repression are argued to be more 
likely to experience violence as a result of grievances (Acuña, 2015; Cederman 
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et al., 2013b). A major contributing factor to state repression and violence is a 
large indigenous population or strong ethnic disparities (Cederman et al., 
2013b). Acuna (2015) argues that a legacy of fighting for indigenous rights and 
self-determination will enable groups to mobilise repeatedly throughout history 
(Acuña, 2015). In particular, if indigenous groups are overlooked during 
negotiation settlements over mineral deposits located on indigenous land, this is 
likely to end in conflict of some form (violent or non-violent) (Altman, 2012).  
For grievances to generate violent conflict, Cederman et al. (2013) argue that it 
is a two-step process. Firstly, the grievances must be generated, and then the 
grievances lead to violent conflict (Cederman et al., 2013b). However, 
grievances on their own are not enough to explain how violent conflict occurs, 
an opportunity to rebel (as discussed in more detail below), or a trigger is 
needed, for example a break down of social or political order as a result of 
failed elections, or famine (Cederman et al., 2013c). Grievances rest “upon the 
claim that an injustice has been inflicted upon undeserving victims. Grievances 
are normative protests, claiming violations of rights or rules” (Williams, 2003). 
Most conceptualisations of social conflict are problems of governance related 
to the distribution of revenue, transparency, or the formal political system 
(Acuña, 2015). This discontent is what enables groups to mobilise, groups that 
are economically deprived, marginalised or excluded from the political process 
(M Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).  
The type of regime can influence the likelihood of grievances occurring, some 
making grievances more likely than others. For example, state regimes that are 
dependent on popular support for accountability are less likely to create 
grievances, as opposed to autocratic (non-democratic) regimes (Cederman et 
al., 2013b; Regan & Norton, 2005). Additionally, ‘the response of the state has a 
large impact on the subsequent behaviour of the rebels’ (Regan & Norton, 
2005). Non-democratic governments are likely to make less, or no attempt, to 
meet certain groups’ demands for redress, and are more likely to react with 
harsh violence and repression, pushing the opposition to use violence in 
response (Cederman et al., 2013b; Regan & Norton, 2005). Non-democratic 
governments are often unable or unwilling to fairly redistribute the revenue 
earned from resource extraction (Fjelde, 2009). Conversely, democratic 
governments are more transparent and accountable to the population, 
meaning that if the government behaved in a way that could create 
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grievances; for example unfairly distributing resource revenue, the regime is 
likely to be replaced through elections, rather than through violent conflict. 
The benefits of a soldier joining a movement must outweigh the costs of not 
joining. These costs can include the violence they may be subjected to, 
protection from the movement for themselves and their family, or financial 
costs (loss of income due to fighting or gaining income from fighting) (M 
Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; van der Ploeg & Rohner, 2012). The costs 
endured by soldiers are a major challenge to grievance theory where 
motivations become blurred, in particular, when financial incentives are 
involved. However, financial incentives are more relevant to opportunity theory, 
which will be discussed in the next section. Additionally, ethnicity and other 
social ties can act as a ‘coordination device that could be exploited for 
collective mobilisation’ (Cederman et al., 2013c). Rebel leaders can use 
grievances and pre-existing ethnic and social networks to recruit soldiers and 
support (Cederman et al., 2013b). Cederman et al. (2013) note that network 
connections can ‘lower the social transaction cost of mounting 
demonstrations’, because members are not likely to be alienated from the 
community if they are all in the movement together (Cederman et al., 2013b). 
Weinstein (2007) also notes that strong social ties enable rebel groups to create 
networks that are capable of using violence strategically, because they are 
able to construct strong relationships that yield information on defectors 
(Weinstein, 2007). 
The main critique of grievance theory suggests that common interests and a 
target are not enough on their own to sustain a movement (Regan & Norton, 
2005). Free riders are a problem within opposition movements based on 
grievances. Free riders are people that do not pay the price of rebellion 
through fighting, but reap the benefits the movement receives if they succeed 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Regan & Norton, 2005; Snyder, 2006). Humphreys 
states that ‘rational, self-interested individuals will not bear the costs of acting 
and will free ride’ (M Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). Wars occur when there are 
opportunities to form successful rebel groups; overcoming the free-rider 
problem is one way in which these opportunities arise. By offering material 
incentives to soldiers to support and fight, movements can prevent free riding 
(Cederman et al., 2013b; M Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Regan & Norton, 
2005). Therefore, by overcoming the challenges of free riders, these methods 
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fall under the category of opportunity based theories, which will be discussed in 
the next section. 
Opportunity 
Opportunity theory suggests that groups will take into account and consider 
the costs and benefits of their actions, if people think they are likely to succeed 
at something; they are more likely to attempt it. With reference to violent 
conflict, if groups have access to soldiers, weapons, and the ability to fund and 
sustain their movement, they will be able to instigate a rebellion (Collier et al., 
2009). Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) posit that ‘where a rebellion is 
financially and militarily feasible it will occur’ (Collier et al., 2009). If a potential 
rebel movement can predict or interpret the likely response to their actions, 
they will plan ahead in order to get the best possible outcome. For example, if 
low-level violence is likely to have the state respond with higher-level violence 
and repression, the rebel group may spend more time building up their arsenal, 
training their army, and preparing for civil war. Alternatively, if a potential rebel 
group expects the government to respond with negotiations and not repress 
the movement, the group will be more successful at recruiting, because the 
costs of rebellion will be lower for all involved. Collier et al.’s (2009) theory is 
focused on the financial opportunity for violence and conflict, led by a social 
entrepreneur (Collier et al., 2009). 
Military feasibility refers to the ability of the rebel army to fight the states’ 
military. If the state has ‘effective localised control of its entire territory’ the rebel 
army will have fewer chances to mobilise due to the states ability to detect and 
capture potential rebels (Collier et al., 2009). Additionally, if rebels know there 
will be challenges to their mobilisation, and their likelihood of success, they will 
be less likely to organise a rebellion (Collier et al., 2009).  For example, Le Billon 
(2011) suggests that proximity to central government influences the likelihood of 
a successful rebellion, arguing that the further from central government, the 
more successful a movement will be because the government may struggle to 
monitor and police potential rebel movements further from the capital (Philippe 
Le Billon, 2011). Therefore, groups far from the capital are more likely to initiate 
rebellions.  Other studies argue that In countries with high levels of inequality, 
ethnic fractionalisation, or a large marginalised community, the influence and 
strength of the government becomes weaker the further from the capital the 
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marginalised groups are located (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). In addition, the 
presence of natural resources in these regions could provide potential rebel 
groups with a source of income and increase the ease with which rebel groups 
can be formed (Asal et al., 2015; Macartan Humphreys, 2005). 
The ability for rebel movements to finance a rebellion can be connected to 
their access to resources and their ability to utilise them to pay for rebellion 
(Macartan Humphreys, 2005). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest that rebel 
groups will engage in criminal activities to benefit from natural resources (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2004). Additionally, Fearon and Laitin (2003) note that natural 
resources increase the “prize” of the state, suggesting that the state becomes 
the target for rebel groups if the rebel group can gain control over the state 
they will gain access to the resource revenue, as Englebert and Ron (2004) 
argue was the objective for rebels in the Republic of Congo (Englebert & Ron, 
2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Macartan Humphreys, 2005). Humphreys (2005) also 
suggests that third parties can act in greedy ways that make the most of 
natural resources and lack of civil order, referring to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, where companies and neighbouring countries foster rebellion in order 
to gain favourable access to the raw materials without the restrictions of 
effective governance (Macartan Humphreys, 2005).  
Collier et al. (2009) argue that for a rational rebellion, the ‘motivations are likely 
to reflect benefits during conflict, rather than prospective benefits consequent 
upon victory’ (Collier et al., 2009). This suggests that individuals will be less likely 
to fight for the promise of rewards upon their victory, they need to be rewarded 
or paid during the conflict for it to be worthwhile, or feasible, for the fighters 
(Collier et al., 2009). ‘Further, if the rebellion is rationally motivated it is more 
likely to be due to benefits that accrue to the rebel leadership itself, rather than 
to the attainment of social justice for a wider group’ (Collier et al., 2009). In 
other words, rebel groups fight for the benefits they will gain throughout the 
fighting, and when there is an opportunity for violent rebellion, conflict 
entrepreneurs will make the most of the opportunities (Collier et al., 2009).  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that insurgency hinges on state weakness, 
‘especially in peripheral areas with rough terrain’, which can provide 
opportunities for potential rebel groups to mobilise (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). A 
weak state is one with weak capabilities and a limited security reach, meaning 
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that groups located further away from central government are less likely to 
face counterinsurgency or punishment, making it easier for them to fight for 
secession or regional autonomy (Philippe Le Billon, 2011; Sorens, 2011). Le billon 
(2011) outlines the likelihood of regional groups fighting to take control of their 
region, instead of fighting to overthrow the state (Philippe Le Billon, 2011). A 
weak state, accompanied by the ability of the group to access natural 
resource wealth, will provide the means and opportunity for groups to fight for 
secession or autonomy. Sorens (2011) found in his study that local mineral 
abundance was ‘positively related to secessionist or territorial conflict’ among 
ethno-regional groups (Sorens, 2011). Opportunities such as lootable natural 
resources, alluvial gemstones and narcotics have been argued to be 
commonly used to fund conflicts (Macartan Humphreys, 2005; Regan & Norton, 
2005; Snyder, 2006; Sorens, 2011; van der Ploeg & Rohner, 2012). However, the 
majority of scholars who argue the opportunity mechanism also admit that it is 
not a strong empirical argument for the root cause of conflict onset, and that it 
is more likely to influence the duration and intensity of conflict (Regan & Norton, 
2005; van der Ploeg & Rohner, 2012).  
Violent conflict is more likely when opportunity costs of fighting are low, that is, 
the rewards gained from participating in the violence outweigh the costs to 
individuals and groups (Cederman et al., 2013c; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The 
opportunity theory argues for individualist strategies of conflict, where ‘natural 
resources invite warlords and their followers to enrich themselves by looting and 
rent seeking (Cederman et al., 2013c). Cederman et al (2013) note that war 
conditions often bring out the worst in people (Cederman et al., 2013c). Groups 
pursuing profit in chaos, through predation, in a resource rich nation will loot 
easily accessible natural resources such as alluvial gemstones (Cederman et 
al., 2013c). As opposed to minerals, oil or gas, which require capital-intensive 
investment and infrastructure to exploit. These resources may play a different 
role in the onset of conflict and the severity of violence experienced. Thies 
(2010) found that oil plays a direct, positive role on civil war onset, and that 
political instability was also significantly and positively related to the onset of 
civil war (Thies, 2010).  
Protection, punishment and selective benefits all contribute to the rate of 
mobilisation of rebel groups. In particular, rebels will fight if they will benefit 
personally, benefits such as, protection from government retaliation, to avoid 
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punishment for not joining the movement, or if they receive material incentives 
(Regan & Norton, 2005). Additionally, the level of sophistication and aggression 
of a rebel group may influence people’s decisions to fight. Rebel groups that 
are more aggressive, are more likely to use violence against individuals and 
villages, in order to recruit fighters (Regan & Norton, 2005).  
The ‘transaction costs’, or the costs associated with fighting a civil war for the 
state, Thies (2010) argues are higher when some aspects of economy are 
lootable, for example alluvial gemstones, by internal rivals (Thies, 2010). The 
presence of lootable resources provide opportunities to hijack the revenue 
from the state; therefore increasing the costs for the state and raising the 
transaction costs because the state will have to pay for the conflict from 
another source (Thies, 2010). When there are low transaction costs, increased 
revenue and high bargaining power the state has a stronger security apparatus 
to prevent internal rivals from forming (Thies, 2010). However, natural resources 
are a ‘natural source of revenue for both rulers and rebels’ and can fuel 
predation (Snyder, 2006; Thies, 2010). Institutions that rely primarily on revenue 
from lootable resources to contribute to government income and to maintain 
order are susceptible to fiscal crises and instability (Snyder, 2006; Thies, 2010). 
Weak institutions as a result, are vulnerable to collapse and make it easier for 
rebels to organise against them (Snyder, 2006; Thies, 2010). 
A strong state, with effective control of resource revenue and a strong military 
apparatus, is less likely to be the target of violence. A weak state, with ample 
opportunities for groups to access natural resource revenue, is more likely to 
experience conflicts. These arguments for state strength and rebels ability to 
access resources for financing refer to oil and lootable resources with reference 
to greed and opportunities as mechanisms for violent conflict onset 
(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010; Fjelde, 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Less well 
examined are situations where a poor and weak government, with an 
abundance of mineral resources that require intensive investment and 
infrastructure to extract the minerals. Oil extraction and weak governance has 
been examined in regard to transparency, corruption and the high likelihood of 
conflict, however, is capital intensive extraction more or less likely to encourage 
opportunistic rebels to instigate violence when the means of extraction are 
public or private? The type of extraction has not been a significant factor in 
discussions on natural resources and conflict, although, some studies suggest, 
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that the total value of mineral production matters, when it comes to rebel 
constituencies deciding whether to fight (Sorens, 2011). 
Regan and Norton (2005) suggest that grievances may be enough to motivate 
mobilisation when initiating conflict (Regan & Norton, 2005). However, 
sustaining large-scale violence or civil war is not cheap, rebel organisations 
need financing (Regan & Norton, 2005). Cederman et al. (2013) and Weinstein 
(2007) note that opportunistic rebel groups tend to be more focused on the 
short-term material gains, rather than ‘securing access to executive control 
over the state’ (Cederman et al., 2013c; Weinstein, 2007). Regan and Norton 
(2005) note that greed and opportunity play a small but influential component 
of explaining violent conflict in resource rich countries (Regan & Norton, 2005). 
However, they argue that it offers a solution to the problems of defections and 
free riders that plague the grievance theory (Regan & Norton, 2005). Regan 
and Norton (2005) argue that looting can offer selective benefits for soldiers, to 
ensure they stay loyal and are rewarded for their efforts (Regan & Norton, 
2005). Alternatively, a combination or hybrid theory can provide ample 
explanations for the onset of violence.  
In this section, I have outlined the main theoretical frameworks used in the 
literature, grievance and opportunity. In the next section I will define the main 
argument of this thesis and how the onset and severity of violence is connected 
to private and state-owned resource extraction. Using existing theoretical 
frameworks, I will show how a combination of grievance and opportunity 
theories can effectively explain the connection between the ownership of 
resource extraction and the onset and severity of violence.  
Main Argument 
The theory formulated in this thesis suggests that groups will act on grievances 
against resource extraction when the opportunity arises, opportunities such as, 
a support base and access to resources to fight. The severity of violence 
present is dependent on the type of resource extraction present. Some 
movements may start with low-level violence, and the anticipated response 
they will determine whether they will escalate their efforts and use high-level 
violence that could result in civil war. I am arguing that when the resource 
extraction firm is state-owned, potential rebels will calculate that the state is 
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likely to respond with severe repression and high-level violence. For the 
movement to be successful, they will need to escalate their efforts if they want 
to stand a chance against the state. This argument suggests that only strong 
groups will initiate conflict and will be more likely to experience long conflicts. 
Weaker groups should opt out of rebellion altogether in this context.  
Alternatively, I argue that if resource extraction is privately owned, the costs of 
violence are high for all involved (state, firm, rebel group), which should result in 
the company being more likely to suggest negotiations to reach a settlement in 
order to avoid the escalation of violence. In this context, weaker rebel groups 
will initiate conflict more often, but these conflicts will quickly de-escalate as the 
incentives for a negotiated settlement is high. I will further explain these theories 
below. 
The response from and the behaviour of groups may be different depending on 
what sort of resource extraction firm is present, whether it is state owned or 
private. The type of resource extraction firm may influence whether a rebel 
movement will need to resource themselves for large-scale civil war, or if low-
level violence and unrest is enough to threaten the company/government and 
promote redress. In some cases, low-level violence or the threat of violence 
may be enough to pressure the government or company into responding, with 
either concessions or violence, in order to prevent disruptions to operations and 
therefore revenue. I argue that profit, reputation and access to security forces 
are factors that contribute to the relationship between communities and 
natural resource extractors, the potential sensitivity to these factor will drive 
whether the relationship is peace or conflict inducing.  
Definitions 
In this thesis I am using a relatively broad definition of violence. First, I use ‘low-
level violence’ which refers to events that are likely to result in low fatalities, 
activities such as damage to property and extortion. Second, I use ‘high-level 
violence’ which refers to events that are likely to result in higher casualties, 
activities that suggest the indiscriminate use of violence, such as massacres and 
violent repression (Weinstein, 2007). Weinstein (2007) explains the levels of 
violence during conflict comparing opportunistic rebellions with activist 
rebellions (Weinstein, 2007). Weinstein uses ‘intensity’ and ‘character’ of 
violence to explain how violence changes throughout and between conflicts, 
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where intensity measures the number of killings, attacks and incidents of 
coercion, and character measures ‘the range of violent behaviour rebel 
groups exhibit and the identity of their targets’ (Weinstein, 2007). In this thesis, 
the activist rebellion provides insight into the behaviour of rebel groups, for 
example, Weinstein argues that activist groups are likely to be more strategic 
with their attacks, as more often than not, they are weaker than the 
government in which case, rebel groups will ‘avoid conventional battles in 
favour of tactics that emphasise stealth and surprise’ (Weinstein, 2007). 
Opportunity theory could be useful for explaining how violence is connected to 
state-owned resource extraction, as the theory is more effective at explaining 
large-scale rebellion and civil war, which I predict will be more likely with state-
owned extraction, than it is for low-level violence, which I predict will be more 
likely when a private resource extraction firm is present (M. L. Ross, 2004). The 
location of the resources may contribute to the level of response from the 
government towards attacks against infrastructure. The closer the infrastructure 
to central government, the more likely the response will be swift and strong, 
whereas, the further the infrastructure from central government, the less intense 
the response may be (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Philippe Le Billon, 2011). The 
location of the resources has also been argued to determine how likely a 
secessionist conflict will be (Philippe Le Billon, 2011; Sorens, 2011). The weaker 
the reach of the government, the easier it is for rebels to organise, because 
they are less likely to be noticed and therefore not likely to be punished. 
However, the likelihood of the state influence being weak when a state-owned 
extraction company is present is unlikely.  
The economic and development context of a state could also influence the 
type of extraction firm that invests in the state and therefore the type of 
violence it will experience. In order to entice foreign direct investment into their 
state, governments minimise regulations and conditions to minimise the costs 
and maximise the profits for the companies (O'Brien & Williams, 2010). This 
means governments reduce the checks and balances that are in place to 
ensure companies minimise their impact on the environment and communities, 
resulting in companies that are not accountable for their impact on the 
environment or the community, which can lead to grievances from the local 
population. An example of this is Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, where the 
government allowed the mining company a high level of autonomy, through 
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very low regulations resulting in environmental consequences. These 
consequences damaged the reputation of the mine and caused irreversible 
damage to the surrounding land, leading to disputes between the local 
population and the mining company, ultimately erupting into secessionist 
conflict (Paivi Lujala, 2010; Reuveny, Maxwell, & Davis, 2011). I will discuss the 
implications of deregulation and ownership of resource extraction later in this 
thesis, first I will outline the causal story of this thesis with particular reference to 
private extraction followed by state-owned extraction. 
Private Extraction  
H1 – Countries with private extraction firms will experience low-level violence 
and extortion. 
Governments that lack the capabilities to facilitate development and 
economic growth on their own are often at the mercy of international private 
firms for their injection of money into the economy, through rents, export taxes, 
infrastructure, and job creation (van der Ploeg, 2011). However, foreign direct 
investment could backfire on the government, companies could bring in their 
own migrant workers, and often huge mineral projects will result in an increase 
in migration of people in search of work, leaving a growing population of 
unemployed people, often young men, which has been argued to increase 
the risk of conflict occurring (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Collier et al., 2009; M 
Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). Governments that are dependent on resource 
extraction companies for the rents they receive, are likely to be more sensitive 
to disruptions to production from potential rebels. Therefore, if community 
groups have issues with a resource extraction company and its operation, the 
company is likely to become the target of the opposition groups’ aggression.  
Potential rebel groups are often motivated by grievances, such as, land rights, 
environmental degradation, forced migration, or unequal distribution of 
resource revenue. The introduction of natural resource extraction can often 
result in such grievances being produced. Indigenous communities, in 
particular, can often be overlooked, or purposely excluded, during the 
development of resource extraction projects (Switzer, 2001). For example, 
indigenous communities in Australia were forced to relocate so that companies 
could construct and develop their extraction and production sites (Altman, 
2012). Alternatively, groups may be motivated to extort companies because of 
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environmental degradation resulting from resource extraction. For example, 
Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, where members of the local community, in 
protest of the lack of compensation for environmental degradation, escalated 
attacks against the mining company into full-scale secessionist conflict (Boege 
& Franks, 2012; Paivi Lujala, 2010). Or finally, they may be protesting the lack of 
jobs they were promised when the mining companies signed agreements with 
the government (Acuña, 2015; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Paivi Lujala, 2010; 
M. L. Ross, 2004; Zandvliet, 2005). 
I posit that when resource extraction is privately owned, the state and 
company is more likely to enter into negotiation and grant concessions, when 
met with a potential rebel movement. Private extraction companies are more 
susceptible to disruptions to productivity because they are sensitive to the costs 
that arise from being accountable to a diverse range of actors: the 
government, shareholders of the company, and customers where they need to 
ensure their reputation is not damaged (Zandvliet, 2005). As a result, potential 
rebel groups, in anticipation of the mild response to their actions, are able to 
instigate many smaller attacks against resource extraction infrastructure. 
Potential rebel groups may believe that they will be more successful at getting 
what they want from private extraction companies through extortion, or threat 
of violence. Additionally, the state will be constrained in its behaviour to ensure 
uninterrupted production, especially if they are dependent on the revenue 
they receive from resource extraction. Some states may not have the resources 
or capabilities to extract natural resources without the company’s investment. 
Therefore, states in this situation will be more likely to negotiate deals and push 
for concessions to be made, than to let the violence escalate to high-level 
violence or civil war. Low-level violence is more likely to affect the private 
company, because they are sensitive to costs such as; damage to extraction 
infrastructure that can disrupt production rates, and therefore revenue.  
Furthermore, private firms are likely to have international repercussions if they 
are involved in violence and conflict; they have an international reputation to 
uphold for customers, shareholders and governments of other countries they 
operate in. For example, Talisman Energy in Sudan was accused of being 
complicit in the conflict by allowing government forces access to their airstrip 
to launch air raids; Talisman Energy was seen to be supporting a government 
involved in genocide (Switzer, 2001). If private firms are seen to encourage or 
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be complicit in high levels of violence, it could impact their ability to win 
contracts in other countries, they may experience civil resistance movements 
and boycotting by customers worldwide who oppose the firm’s involvement in 
violent activities or the firm’s lack of condemnation for violent movements 
(Switzer, 2001). Therefore, private firms are more likely to propose a solution or 
deal before there is too much damage to their infrastructure, their reputation 
and their profits. Additionally, private firms may be able to influence on the way 
the government may respond, if the government responds with violent 
repression, this will impact the reputation of the firm internationally; therefore, 
the firm will encourage the government to respond in a manner that is 
beneficial for all parties involved (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2004). A swift response 
from the company to propose negotiations or a settlement, will act as a 
deterrent for the state to use its repressive powers, and potentially escalate the 
conflict. The actions of the company, the government and rebel groups differ 
when the extraction is state-owned, however, this will be discussed further 
below, next I will explain what motivates potential rebel groups to mobilise and 
fight using low-level violence when extraction is privately owned. 
Opportunity theory suggests that rebels will consider the most effective 
methods that will enable their success; potential rebels are rational groups that 
consider the costs and benefits of mobilisation and instigating violence. Low-
level violence, compared to high-level violence, against a private extraction 
firm, is more cost effective and more feasible, for both the firm and the 
movement. For low-level violence potential rebel movements do not need to 
raise a lot of capital to fund their efforts, they can stage small but targeted 
attacks against the company’s infrastructure, they can organise protests in front 
of the company’s offices, or mining sites, small events that cause a nuisance or 
disrupt their operations momentarily. Low-level violence is unlikely to escalate 
into an undesirable and expensive civil war. A civil war is likely to cost the 
extraction company because it is likely to suspend operations or cause 
expensive damage and disruption to production, and damage the company’s 
reputation if picked up by international media. Low-level violence would be 
enough to pressure the company to respond to the violence with either 
increased security, or through proposing negotiations and diplomacy. The 
company would want a solution that keeps them out of the mainstream media, 
particularly internationally, that does not require diverting money from 
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production towards security and that deters the state from responding with 
extreme repression. Low-level violence also means lower costs to the 
movement, as it is easier to recruit supporters when the benefits outweigh the 
costs of joining, based on the belief that the state will not respond with strong 
violent repression. When resource extraction is privately owned potential rebels 
believe they are less likely to be met with violent repression and retaliation, and 
they do not need to prepare for full-scale civil war by building up their weapons 
arsenal. In other words, joining the movement is an attractive option for 
aggrieved members of the community. 
The response of a company to aggression from rebel groups may depend on 
the stage of development the extraction operation is at. In particular, if a 
company is in the early stages of exploration, or pre-production, the company 
may be dependent on the government, and the concessions they have 
granted, for financial support, such as, tax breaks and low tariffs. If there is a 
change in government throughout the exploration and pre-production period, 
the extraction firm may become the main source of campaign material. For 
example, in Ghana during the 2008 election, the campaigns were appealing to 
the people and promising that the profits of the planned oil extraction, from the 
partnership between Kosmos Energy and the government, on the Jubilee field 
project, will make it directly to the people of Ghana (Boynton, 2013). As a result 
of the financial crisis of 2008, Kosmos Energy were struggling financially, and 
were working deals with all the candidates, and the existing president to ensure 
that Kosmos would continue to receive favourable tax rates and financial 
agreements (Boynton, 2013). Low-level violence, such as sabotaging company 
property, could be a feasible strategy for potential rebels that want to punish 
the extraction company or the outgoing government for perceived 
inequalities.  
State-owned extraction companies 
H2 - Countries with state-owned extraction firms will be more likely to 
experience high-level violence. 
When there is a state-owned resource extraction company present, I posit that 
the government is likely to respond to rebel groups who attack the resource 
extraction infrastructure with violence. State-owned extraction companies 
share the costs of the infrastructure and production with the government. 
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Therefore, when potential rebel movements attack the extraction company, 
they are attacking the government. The more a government is dependent on 
the revenue from resources, the more aggressive the response to rebellion is 
likely to be. Countries with a state-owned resource extraction firm will be more 
likely to experience high-level violence, as opposed to low-level violence, 
because the shared costs mean the government will be able to absorb the 
costs of extreme violence and repression because it has a monopoly on power. 
Additionally, these states are not accountable to an international market or 
shareholders; therefore, they are not as concerned for the way their behaviour 
will be received internationally, in comparison to a private firm.  
Governments have the capability to use force to defeat aggressive 
movements against its resource infrastructure, and are more likely to use 
excessive force, especially if the government is highly dependent on the 
revenues earned from the resource extraction. States that are dependent on 
resources for their revenue will use their power and capabilities, for example the 
army, in an attempt to secure an uninterrupted flow of revenue from resource 
extraction. Therefore, these states are more likely to use violence and repression 
to quash potential rebel movements that attack resource extraction 
infrastructure. The government is more likely to respond to violence with full 
military force, because it will be able to absorb the costs of rebellion - loss of life, 
disruptions to production and profit, and damage to reputation - and has the 
military capability to shut down potential rebellions with high-level violence. If 
mineral extraction is damaged or disrupted as a result of rebel action, the 
government will be able to absorb the costs easier than a private company, 
and will be less likely to face international backlash.  
Opportunity theory assumes that potential rebels will not attempt a rebellion if 
they do not have the means to fight, meaning, if the potential rebels do not 
have a sufficient support base, and willing soldiers, they are unlikely to get very 
far (Collier et al., 2009). In order to recruit willing participants in the rebellion, 
potential fighters will weigh up the costs and benefits of conflict, if they think the 
costs are higher than the benefits, they will be unwilling to join the movement 
(M Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). Potential rebels, anticipating the response 
from the government, will see that low-level violence will be unlikely to 
succeed; therefore, they will need to be able to endure a severe repressive 
response from the government, and will need to build a strong insurgency 
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movement. As a result of high-level violence, these rebel groups are more likely 
to see prolonged conflict and civil war. For potential rebels to perceive conflict 
as feasible, they will need to have a fair assessment of the government’s 
capabilities and the power of the military. Therefore, only strong groups will 
initiate rebellion and the weak groups will opt out, as the stronger the group, 
the more capable they are of initiating rebellion using high-level violence, and 
surviving the longer conflict.  
When a State owned extraction company is present, potential rebel groups will 
need strong resolve, they will learn quickly that low-level violence will not get 
them far, and will need to slowly build their strength to be able to escalate their 
aggression. Recruitment to the rebel movement, as a result of government 
violence and repression, may increase from witnesses, adding soldiers and 
supporters to the movement. Alternatively, the states’ reaction may even drive 
people away from the rebels because of fear of punishment from the 
government, strong government repression may result in mass defections, and 
consequently, the rebel movement losing traction and falling back into the 
shadows. We may however see the more aggressive the response from 
government, the stronger the community and the rebel movement, as their 
beliefs and purpose may be reinforced by the violent actions of the 
government forces.  
Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the common theories used to explain how 
natural resources contribute to the onset of violence, and have formulated a 
causal story for how both private extraction companies, and state-owned 
extraction companies can influence the actions of potential rebel groups, the 
government response and the level of violence used. I argue that states with 
private resource extraction are more likely to experience low-level violence 
and extortion as a response from aggrieved groups/sections of the community 
affected by the resource extraction process, and consequently, are less likely to 
see civil war onsets. The likely response to extortion will be concessions and 
agreements made in order to reduce the impact of the actions on production, 
profit and reputation for both the company and the government that may be 
dependent on the rents received from the extraction process. Potential rebel 
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movements are aware of the sensitivity to costs, they anticipate the 
government response and cater their actions accordingly; meaning that 
people will be more willing to join their movement because the costs of joining 
are low, while the benefits and likelihood of success are high. 
Alternatively, countries with state-owned resource extraction will be more likely 
to experience high-level violence with probable escalation to civil war. 
Violence against state-owned extraction firms is likely to result in a severe 
response from the government, because it has the capability and the 
precedence to use any level of force it deems necessary to quash potential 
rebel movements. When extraction is state-owned, governments are better 
equipped to absorb the costs to profit, infrastructure and reputation, compared 
to private owned resource extraction which is more sensitive to potential costs 
to their reputation and the long term effects to their profit. Potential rebel 
groups will be aware that low-level violence will be unlikely to hurt the target of 
their aggression, and will prepare for escalation of violence and a prolonged 
conflict. The potential rebels will need soldiers with strong resolve, which may be 
aided by the aggressive state response which could push people towards 
joining the rebel movement, increasing their capacity and their chances of 
success. 
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4. Methodology 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will outline the processes that I will undertake to test the effect 
that ownership of resource extraction has on the level of violence in Latin 
America and Africa, 1989-2014. As shown in the previous chapters of this thesis, 
there is a gap in the literature around the ownership of resource extraction and 
how this can affect the level of violence a state may experience. In my theory 
chapter I have also suggested that the level of violence likely to be seen in an 
environment with resource extraction will vary, depending on whether resource 
extraction is owned by a private company or a state owned company. In the 
following sections, I will describe my research design and data collection 
starting with the selection of my dependent variable, followed by the decisions 
that went into coding my independent variables and the selection of my 
control variables. Lastly, I will outline my proposed method of analysis and the 
logic that supports these decisions. 
Research Design 
In this thesis I am using a combination of descriptive, bivariate and multivariate 
analysis to test the likelihood that the levels of violence a state experiences and 
the type of resource extraction companies present, are related. An alternative 
way to investigate the effect that ownership of resource extraction can have 
on the level of violence would be a qualitative case study of a selection of 
countries that have various extractive ownership structures, and have 
experienced different levels of violence. I have opted for the quantitative 
method, as opposed to qualitative, because with this method I can cover a 
larger sample size in the limited time awarded to a master’s thesis. Additionally, 
the quantitative method requires specific hypotheses which will enable me to 
say how likely it is that I am wrong, and provide some numerical estimate to 
how strong a relationship between variables is. The quantitative method is the 
most suitable method for investigating a) whether there is a relationship 
between ownership of resource extraction and the severity of violence 
experienced, and b) what the nature of this relationship is. 
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The quantitative method will enable me to make some predictions for states 
that have similar resource extraction ownership patterns and use this data to 
analyse the vulnerability of states to the occurrence of violence, and the 
severity they are likely to experience. The qualitative method is less 
generalizable and would limit me to explaining the situation and context of the 
case study countries. The qualitative method would make it problematic to 
assume that these situations could be transplanted into other countries. With my 
results, I will be able analyse how the severity of violence in armed conflict 
varies with different legal frameworks and practices of resource extraction. 
These findings could provide policy recommendations for countries that may 
be in similar positions, in particular, how to structure resource ownership policy in 
regards to distribution of revenues, and the governance of minerals, oil and 
gas. In addition, policy officials could anticipate how susceptible countries may 
be to violence as a consequence of resource extraction legislation, and 
prevent situations from deteriorating. In general, the results from this thesis will 
contribute to scholarship and understanding of negative peace, and 
promoting ways to bring about the absence of conflict and violence. 
Sample size 
My sample is of all self-governing countries within Africa and Latin America from 
1989-2014, distributed across country-years. I have selected these two regions 
because they are both rich in a range of natural resources; they both have a 
history of colonialism; and have experienced a range of conflicts. I have limited 
my selection to these two regions because of time restraints, as such; the scope 
of this thesis is limited to describing and showing the relationships between 
resource extraction and violence in these regions. I decided to use the time 
period starting in 1989, in an attempt to minimise the effect of data constraints 
from the availability of reliable data, and the effect of proxy wars, instigated by 
alliances through the Cold War, may have on the results produced in this 
analysis. Additionally, the majority of the states within my analysis had obtained 
independence from their former colonial powers by 1989, and had already 
experienced, and endured, economic problems (Ericsson, Massey, & Petrilli, 
2011) (Omeje, 2008). Africa and Latin America have been used in much of the 
literature on resources and conflict as examples of resource wars, for example; 
Acuna (2015) in Peru, Engelbert and Ron (2004) in Congo and Guidolin and La 
Ferrara (2007) in Angola (Acuña, 2015; Englebert & Ron, 2004; Guidolin & La 
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Ferrar, 2007). Any further research will be suggested in the conclusion. In my 
sample I have 2162 observations of country-years that I have coded for 
resource extraction ownership.  
Dependent Variable 
This thesis aims to explain the incidence of low-level violence and high-level 
violence. The level of violence is measured through the number of fatalities that 
arise from violent events, which I have sourced from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Croicu & Sundberg, 
2015). I am using this dataset because it captures information on lower casualty 
rates compared to other conflict datasets. For example, the UCDP Battle 
Related Deaths dataset captures fatalities per conflict year, meaning that this 
dataset does not capture casualty numbers if no conflict occurs. By using the 
UCDP Battle Related Deaths dataset I would lose the smaller scale conflicts that 
I am interested in. On the other hand the GED dataset captures information on 
conflict when it results in at least one direct death, and includes conflict 
involving informally organised groups (Croicu & Sundberg, 2015). The GED 
dataset defines fatalities to be ‘a death relating to either combat between 
warring parties or violence against civilians’ (Croicu & Sundberg, 2015). 
Additionally, in this dataset I am not differentiating by the type of conflict. The 
dependent variable in this thesis includes all non-state violence, state based 
violence, and one-sided violence, when an event results in at least one fatality, 
it is included in this dataset. 
To create my dependent variable I used the ‘best estimate of total fatalities’ in 
the GED dataset to represent the levels of violence I wish to show in my analysis 
(Croicu & Sundberg, 2015). In Stata I collapsed the dataset into country-year 
observations and used the sum of the best estimates for fatalities for the given 
country-years to represent the levels of violence. The variable in the GED 
dataset for best estimate of fatalities includes the sum of side a deaths, side b 
deaths, civilian fatalities and deaths unknown (Croicu & Sundberg, 2015). I 
have organised the level of violence into seven categories, coded from 0-6. I 
have coded country-years as a 0 if there were no fatalities recorded in the GED 
dataset. The level of violence is coded as a 1 if the country-year had less than 
25 estimated fatalities (1-24 fatalities), a 2 if the estimated fatalities were 
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between 25-50 (25-49 fatalities), coded as 3 if the fatalities fell between 50 and 
100 (50-99 fatalities), coded as a 4 if the fatalities were between 100 and 500 
(100-499 fatalities), coded as a 5 if the fatalities were between 500 and 1000 
(500-999 fatalities) and finally, coded as a 6 if the best estimate of fatalities 
were over 1000. Additionally, in the robustness tests, I will aggregate the levels 
of violence further, into no violence, low violence, medium violence and high 
violence; where low violence represents fatalities from 1 to 99, medium 
violence represents fatalities from 100 to 999, and high violence is 1000 fatalities 
and above.  
Independent Variables 
In order to test the effect that ownership of resource extraction has on the 
levels of violence, we need a variable to show the type of ownership. I have 
manually coded all country-years for self-governing countries of Africa and 
Latin America for the years 1989-2014 for the dominant type of resource 
extraction company, which occurs within each country-year. I have four 
independent variables, which represent state-owned mineral extraction, state 
owned oil and gas extraction, privately owned mineral extraction and privately 
owned oil and gas extraction. In this dataset, I have 84 countries and a total of 
2162 country-year observations coded across Africa and Latin America. The 
process of manually coding the countries in this dataset involved going through 
all African and Latin American countries to investigate; a) if they had mineral 
resources being extracted, such as coal, silver, gold, copper, among others, 
and/or oil and gas, and b) what sort of company was involved in the extraction 
of said resources, whether the company was state-owned or private. I have not 
used specific selection criteria for when to code a countries resource 
extraction, criteria such as 10% of GDP contributed by natural resource 
extraction that was used by Collier, Hoeffler and Rhoner (2009) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2012) in their research (Collier & Hoefffler, 2012; Collier et al., 2009). I 
have used my independent variable to represent any valuable natural 
resource extraction; I will explain what I mean by valuable natural resources 
further on in this section.  
I have coded countries to have either ‘state’ or ‘private’ oil and mineral 
resource extraction, or no resource extraction. I have four independent 
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variables to represent these categories, each year from 1989 through to 2014 
has been coded as either a ‘0’ if there is no resource extraction or a ‘1’ if there 
is an extraction company. I have coded for the dominant ownership type, 
meaning that a state can have either state or private extraction, but not both, 
in each aspect of natural resource extraction (‘mineral’ and ‘oil and gas’). For 
example Kenya from 1989-1995 had state owned mineral extraction, which 
operated the Kimware ore deposit. The fluorspar project transitioned to a 
privately owned firm from 1996, since then, other mineral deposits, iron ore and 
gold, have been discovered and extracted by private firms (Thomas R Yager, 
2015). Another example from my dataset is Sudan which has state-owned 
mineral extraction and private oil extraction from 1992-2014. Prior to 1992 oil was 
state owned, but entered into agreements with other international oil 
companies through projects such as Greater Nile Petroleum, where the state-
owned oil company (Sudapet) holds 5% interest, along with Indian, Malaysian 
and Chinese national oil companies, and Star Oil Co. where Sudapet holds 34% 
interest (Thomas R. Yager, 2015). Alternatively, the mineral industry in Sudan is 
dominated state-owned ventures where either the government holds the 
majority interest, for example the Ariab Mining Co. where the government holds 
56% interest in the gold mining operations, or the state-owned Sudanese Mining 
Co. which produces gypsum and mica (Thomas R. Yager, 2015). 
In order to code specific countries and their mineral endowment, I used the 
United States Geological Survey’s Mineral Yearbook data as my research base 
(Bernstein, Eros, & Quintana-Velázquez, 2006; Eros & Candelario-Quintana, 
2006). The USGS mineral yearbook provides resource data from the early 1990s 
through to 2013 in their annual state reports (U.S Geological Survey, 2010). The 
annual reports show specific information on mineral policy, exploration, 
exploitation and export activity (U.S Geological Survey, 2010). In some cases 
they provide data on ownership shares of individual mineral projects, which 
allowed me to average the share of state-owned companies and private 
companies involved in a given state on any year that information was provided 
for, in order to code a country-year as having either state-owned or privately 
owned natural resource extraction. Often countries have both state-owned 
and private firms working on different projects around the state and in joint 
ventures. In cases where both private and state-owned firms worked, I looked 
at the overall distribution of firms across the projects and their control of the 
	   57	  
projects, whether they held majority interest in the projects or whether there 
were more privately owned operations than state-owned. When the majority of 
the projects were controlled or operated by a private firm with state-owned 
contributions, this was coded as private extraction. Additionally, if there was a 
relatively even distribution of state-owned and private companies across the 
extraction sector, I looked at the annual productive capacity of the operations, 
the maximum and operation can produce annually, in particular the projects 
that had the largest capacity are considered more influential, and coded 
accordingly (Torres, 2004). For example, a state may have four mineral 
extraction projects active in a given year, two are privately owned, and two 
are state-owned, but one of the privately owned projects’ capacity was 
double that of the state-owned projects, I would code this country-year as 
privately owned. For example, Venezuela’s oil and gas industry, in 2004 there 
were five projects in total, two of which were state-owned. The state-owned 
sector produced an annual capacity of 25000 units in natural gas and 1393 
units of crude petroleum, compared to a total of 147 units of crude petroleum 
produced by the private sector. Therefore, I have coded Venezuela in 2004 as 
state-owned oil and gas (Torres, 2004). 
An alternative way to code my independent variables would be to measure 
the value of resource extraction as part of the economy in order to show the 
importance of the resource to the government. Due to time restraints, I chose 
to use the annual capacity and the number of projects as the measure for 
coding my independent variable, as opposed to looking at the value of the 
resources as part of a state’s economy. I was able to use the annual capacity, 
provided through the USGS annual reports, to measure whether the majority of 
projects and production were private or state-owned. Whereas, if I was to 
measure the proportion of a state’s GDP that was made up by natural resource 
exports, and who owned what proportion, this would involve a lot more time 
and resources, that I could not afford to direct towards this method of coding. 
The method that I undertook will still capture the value of resource extraction to 
the government, however will not be able to measure how much the 
government values resource extraction over other aspects of a state’s 
economy. 
A State-owned company is any company that holds majority shares in the 
majority of the extraction projects in a country-year that is owned by the 
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government or is government controlled. Therefore, for a country-year to be 
coded as a ‘1’ for ‘StateMineral’ or ‘StateOil’ the majority of operations 
needed to be either owned by a government company, or the government’s 
company need to have majority shares and therefore the controlling interest in 
the project. In many countries, there is a policy in place that ensures that the 
government has an interest in the extraction operations. Government interest 
often starts at 10 percent as a minimum, to majority interest, which starts at 51 
percent. These policies are common in developing countries, as it is a way for 
the government to ensure that they receive sufficient revenue from the 
exploitation of their resources. In addition, some projects are the result of ‘joint 
ventures’ between state-owned companies and private companies. Joint 
ventures are often evenly split (50:50) between the two (or more) companies 
involved. In joint ventures, one company will always have the position/role of 
operator. This is the company that is the face of the project, and the other 
partners play more of an investor role, they provide some of the capital to 
establish and build the project, in return for a share of the profits. In cases of 
even joint ventures, I have based my coding on the operating company. If the 
operator is the state-owned company, then this contributes to the share of the 
sector controlled by state-owned extraction company.  
A private company is any company involved in resource extraction that is not 
owned by the government of the state where resources are being extracted. 
This category includes state-owned companies working in other countries, for 
example Sonangol of Angola, which works in Congo Brazzaville, or Petrobras of 
Brazil, which operates in Uruguay and Tanzania among others. State-owned 
companies operating within its government’s borders are coded as state-
owned, but when they begin operations abroad, they are included in the 
coding as private sector, because they behave the same as a private 
company would. Most commonly, private companies are large multinational 
corporations that have operations in many countries around the world. Two 
examples are British Petroleum, which has oil, petroleum and natural gas 
operations in the United Kingdom, Angola, and Trinidad and Tobago, among 
others, or Rio Tinto, which started out in Australia and is now involved in the 
extraction of iron ore, aluminium, copper, coal, gold, diamonds, and other 
minerals around the world (British Petroleum, 2016; Rio Tinto, 2016). Private 
ownership incorporates private domestic companies, companies that originate 
	   59	  
from the state of operation, but are listed as a public company, and do not 
have majority shares controlled or owned by the government. Additionally, this 
coding includes privatised former state companies, or state-owned companies 
that list their shares on the public market.  
For a project to be included in the coding it needed to be in the production 
stage of operations. This means the projects need to have the infrastructure 
built and completed, and be producing their intended product for export. 
There are many stages through which a mineral project goes before it reaches 
the production stage, such as, exploration, drilling, feasibility and construction 
(Office of Technology Assessment, 1979). The stages that precede production in 
the development of a mineral or oil project are not relevant to my study 
because at any stage the company can withdraw from the project without 
major costs. At any point in time there can be numerous companies, state-
owned and private, participating in exploration in any state. Exploration 
companies are not permanent or influential enough to be sufficient for 
potential rebels to launch a sustained rebellion, because they are not 
contributing to a state’s economy nor do they have physical infrastructure that 
could influence potential rebels’ decisions to instigate violence (Fjelde, 2009). 
Some studies have found that oil discoveries are correlated with conflict onset 
in very poor countries (Bell & Wolford, 2015; Cotet & Tsui, 2013). However, 
scholars argue that this conflict is motivated by commitment problems that 
arise in the brief window before the state receives the oil revenues that can be 
used to increase spending on the military and the security apparatus (Bell & 
Wolford, 2015; Cotet & Tsui, 2013). The presence of physical infrastructure, such 
as an oilrig, mining buildings, and the equipment and machinery used for the 
extraction of minerals, suggests that there will also be staff present. Potential 
rebels can use infrastructure and staff as a source of extortion, through 
threatening to damage or kidnap staff, in an attempt to seek compensation or 
concessions. Therefore I have included projects into my coding if they have the 
infrastructure built, and there is production occurring.  
I have disaggregated my independent variables in an attempt to capture 
what other studies have not been able to. Other studies that have looked into 
the effect of natural resource extraction and conflict have limited their scope 
to ‘high-value resources’ such as oil and precious gemstones (diamonds) 
(Collier & Hoefffler, 2012; P Lujala et al., 2005; T. Wegenast, 2015). Because I am 
	   60	  
looking at the effect of ownership by the type of company participating in the 
mineral sector, I have expanded my scope, compared to other studies, so that I 
can investigate the effect on minerals in addition to oil and gas (T. Wegenast, 
2015). In this study I have included fuels such as oil and gas, and mined minerals 
such as bauxite, coal, copper, gold, secondary diamonds, uranium, 
phosphate, and tantalum, to name a few. I have separated oil and gas from 
minerals because in most countries, the same companies that extract oil also 
tend to be involved with the extraction of natural gas. Natural gas deposits are 
often found in the same area as oil, where oil companies can use similar 
machinery and equipment to extract the commodity without much increase in 
costs to the company (Morse & Turgeon, 2016). 
I have excluded construction minerals from my coding because they are not 
considered as “high value to weight” resources. Construction minerals do not 
require extensive extraction infrastructure or knowledge of complicated 
geological or market patterns, and are not often used for export revenue. 
Minerals like limestone is mostly used in the domestic market of a state, and 
therefore, does not compare with other minerals that are extracted by large 
extraction companies and sold on the international market, resulting in large 
revenue from rents and taxes for the government (Miller, 2014). Ultimately, if a 
natural resource requires specialised infrastructure and staff to extract it, and it 
is likely to earn a company and/or the government significant revenue from the 
costs of extraction, marketing and trading internationally, it has been coded for 
in my dataset. The decision to exclude some minerals based on how valuable 
the mineral can be for extraction companies, governments and potential rebel 
groups meant I did not code for minerals such as; limestone, asbestos, arsenic, 
cement, clays, salts, sand, and gravel (U.S Geological Survey, 2010). 
Control Variables 
In order for the results from this thesis to be robust, valid and reliable, I need to 
control for other variables that can be considered as alternative explanations 
for the level of violence experienced and the presence of state or privately 
owned extraction structures. In this section I will outline the known variables that 
could be considered plausible causes of violence. The compositional 
differences between countries that could suggest plausible explanations are 
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represented by the control variables listed in this section (Pollock, 2012). These 
are variables that I will hold constant during my analysis so that we can see the 
effect that my independent variable, type of resource ownership, has on the 
dependent variable, level of violence.  
I will control for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the type of political 
regime, and resource rents. Most of the control variables used in this thesis, for 
example GDP per capita, were sourced from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (The World Bank, 2015). In addition to this 
database, I have also used the polity scale database to control for the regime 
type of countries (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014). These variables and the 
logic for their inclusion are explained in more detail below. 
GDP per capita 
Fearon and Laitin in their 2003 article outline the main conditions that contribute 
to the onset of insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Included in their analysis was 
GDP per capita as a representation of how wealthy a state is. In order to ensure 
that countries are comparable, GDP is measured per capita so that despite the 
size of a countries population, we can compare the wealth (M. Ross, 2013). 
Additionally GDP per capita can reflect a state’s development status and its 
ability to provide more for the population. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) note 
that poor countries are less able to provide basic needs for its population, and 
therefore more likely to result in grievances which encourage potential rebel 
groups (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). In my analysis I have logged the GDP 
measures in order to control for the outliers at the top of the distribution of GDP 
data that may skew the results. Additionally, GDP per capita can be utilised by 
private resource extraction firms in their decisions on whether to invest in 
regions, because GDP per capita reflects a countries economic capacity and 
how well a company can grow within the region (Cederman et al., 2013c).  
Polity scale 
Ted Robert Gurr first directed the research of the Polity 1 project in 1974 that 
created the basis for the current polity project (Marshall et al., 2014). The polity 
project investigates the type of regimes countries have, and reflect this on a 
continuum that ranges from -10 for autocratic to 10 for democratic regimes 
(Marshall et al., 2014). Additionally, regimes that fall on the polity scale between 
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-5 and +5 are categorised as anocracies, these regimes tend to be plagued by 
political instability, which can exacerbate existing social and political 
cleavages and lead to violence (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Marshall et al., 2014). It 
has been argued that the type of political regime could affect the likelihood of 
violence (Marshall et al., 2014). In particular, Marshal, Gurr and Jaggers (2014) 
argue that anocratic regimes are more likely to experience violence because 
of the instability that accompanies the type of regime (Marshall et al., 2014). 
Democratic regimes are more accountable to their populations, which 
suggests that they will be more transparent and therefore more likely to 
redistribute wealth fairly (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
In comparison, autocratic regimes may be more likely to hold on to information 
and revenues earned from resource extraction which in turn can stimulate 
grievances and groups wanting to seek to overthrow or fight the regime (I de 
Soysa & Fjelde, 2010; Fjelde, 2009) (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010). Additionally, 
democracies are more likely to have private ownership of resource extraction 
than autocratic regimes (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010). Using the polity scale 
for this thesis will enable me to control for the effect that regime type will have 
on my dependent variable, level of violence.  
Resource rents 
Resource rents have been argued to lead to corruption, misappropriation of 
funds and fraud by some governments (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010; Fjelde, 
2009). Resource rents are the returns on resource extraction, beyond what is 
needed to recover costs and investor return (Natural Resource Governance 
Institute, 2014). Governments that suffer from poor governance and high 
resource rents, also referred to as the ‘resource curse’, are often the targets of 
rebel groups fighting for access to resource rents, or redistribution of rents (M. 
Ross, 2013; Thies, 2010). Alternatively, some governments rely on resource rents, 
instead of taxes, as a source of income, and therefore are no longer 
accountable to its citizens. This creates issues for governance and for 
populations not receiving necessary public goods compared to non-resource 
nations (Fjelde, 2009). Resource rents are also a measure of resource extraction, 
therefore, including them as a control variables will minimise the possibility that 
the results are being driven by comparing ‘any resource extraction’ to ‘no 
resource extraction’ (The World Bank, 2015).  In order to control for the effect of 
resource rents on my dependent variable, I have included variables that 
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measure mineral resource rents, and an aggregated oil and gas rents, as a 
percentage of GDP from the World Bank development indicators dataset (The 
World Bank, 2015). 
Method of Analysis 
Bivariate Hypothesis Tests 
Bivariate hypothesis tests are used to help us answer the question of “are x and 
y related?” (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2008). I will use the chi-squared test of 
significance to assess the relationship between ownership of resource 
extraction and levels of violence (Pollock, 2012). The p-values produced from 
this analysis will show me how statistically significant the relationship between 
my independent and dependent variables may be, by allowing me to either 
reject or accept the null hypothesis that ownership of resource extraction and 
level of violence are not related (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2008; Pollock, 2012).  
Statistical significance is represented by the p-value produced from 
multivariate tests. The p-value shows the probability that the relationship 
between two variables is zero, given the variability in the data (Kellstedt & 
Whitten, 2008). The lower the p-value, the greater confidence we can have 
that there is a systematic relationship between two variables (Kellstedt & 
Whitten, 2008). In order to say a result can be statistically significant, most social 
scientists use the standard p-value threshold of .052, or the more stringent 
threshold of .01 (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2008). In this thesis I am using a threshold of 
.05 to show a statistically significant result, and .01 will show a highly statistically 
significant result (Allison, 1999). If my results yield a p-value of .05 or less then this 
will allow me to reject the null hypothesis, that ownership of resource extraction 
and level of violence are related by chance (Pollock, 2012). If the p-value is 
greater that .05 then this suggests that I cannot reject the null hypothesis, and 
that the likelihood of my dependent and independent variable are related is 
because of random chance (Pollock, 2012).  
In anticipation of my hypothesis tests and the complexity of my independent 
variables (ownership types) I have created additional aggregated variables. I 
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have aggregated the four main independent variables for resource ownership 
into two variables that I will use to describe the data and through the bivariate 
tests. I have modified my independent variables, so that my bivariate tests and 
graphs that describe my data can show the relationship when there is no 
extraction of any form, and when there is private and state-owned mineral 
extraction, or private and state-owned oil and gas extraction.  
Multivariate Regression 
The method I will be using for my multivariate regression is an ordinal logistical 
regression model. I am using this method because it is best suited to the type of 
dependent variable I am using in this analysis, an ordinal variable (Kellstedt & 
Whitten, 2008). Multivariate regression aims to show the magnitude of the effect 
that the independent variables, the type of ownership of resource extraction, 
may have on the dependent variable, the level of violence (Allison, 1999). 
Throughout the multivariate regression I will be using the four independent 
variables that represent private and state-owned mineral and oil and gas 
extraction (private mineral, state-owned mineral, private oil and gas, and state-
owned oil and gas). Conducting an ordinal logistic regression will allow me to 
control for other factors that could contribute to the statistical significance 
produced in the bivariate regression. From this method I will be able to show 
the direction of the relationship, through reading the coefficients produced, 
and whether they are positive or negative. A positive coefficient will represent 
an increase in the level of violence experienced when a private resource 
extraction firm is present. Alternatively, a negative coefficient will suggest a 
reduction in the level of violence experienced when the mode of resource 
extraction is private.  
Robustness tests 
In order to ensure that my results and the subsequent analysis are as robust as 
possible, I will conduct a number of robustness tests. Robustness tests will show 
whether my results have been driven by alternative explanations or if they are 
skewed by any problems with the tests I have conducted. Firstly, the specificity 
of my hypotheses provides the first opportunity for my assumptions to be proven 
wrong. I have proposed that private resource extraction will results in low levels 
of violence, and that state-owned resource extraction will results in high-level 
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violence. The more specific the hypothesis the more chances there are for the 
results to support alternative explanations (Pollock, 2012).  
Secondly, the possibility of reverse causation is not a likely alternative to my 
hypotheses. It does not seem statistically possible, let alone plausible, for the 
level of violence to have an effect on the type of resource extraction. In other 
words, it does not seem to fit that companies, governments and other relevant 
stakeholders will decide whether to invest in resource extraction – whether they 
chose state owned or privately owned companies – based on the level of 
violence the state experiences.  However, the level of violence other countries 
experience, could influence policy makers and companies decisions around 
potential resource extraction investments, particularly with the way that they 
conduct their business, and whether the state is likely to take over production.   
Thirdly, I will conduct more ordinal logistic regressions with additional control 
variables, and to test how the results perform when disaggregated into region. 
These regressions will provide insight into alternative explanations for the 
relationship between the level of violence and the ownership type of resource 
extraction. First, I will repeat the first ordinal logistic regression with extra control 
variables, unemployment and year. I am including these additional control 
variables because they could affect the level of violence. Studies have shown 
that unemployed people are a group at higher risk to joining rebel movements 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003, 2011). Additionally, unemployed locals could be 
considered to have grievances against resource extraction companies, as 
often their production comes with the promise of jobs (Philippe Le Billon, 2011; 
Zandvliet, 2005). I will also include year as a control variable to control for the 
number of conflicts over time, and ensure that this does not drive the results 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010).  
Fourthly, I will conduct multinomial tests, in which I will use further aggregated 
variables to represent my dependent variable. The aggregated dependent 
variable is made up of categories that will measure no violence, low-level 
violence and high-level violence. This test will show how the ownership of 
resource extraction will affect each level of violence independently (Gordon, 
2010). The results from this test will help illustrate the difference between the 
levels of violence, as there is a difference between jumping from low-level 
violence measured by 1-24 fatalities to high-level violence measured as over 
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1000 fatalities. Additionally, if the results from this test hold from the multivariate 
regressions, this will enable me to either accept or reject my hypotheses and 
provide ample points for discussion of the effect that ownership of resource 
extraction has on the severity of violence countries experience.  
Fifth, I will conduct further logistic regressions to test whether the relationships 
between the level of violence and the type of ownership of resource extraction 
holds, when using comparing ownership to no extraction. I will conduct an 
additional ordinal logistic regression to show how the level of violence changes 
when comparing both private and state-owned mineral and oil and gas 
extraction to no extraction. Following these tests, I will conduct another 
multinomial logistic regression in the same way. This test will show how private 
and state-owned extraction (mineral and oil and gas separately) affects low-
level, medium-level and high-level of violence, compared to no extraction. 
Finally, I will conduct ordinal logistic regressions to test if the relationship, 
between private resource extraction (mineral extraction and oil and gas 
extraction) and the level of violence, holds when I disaggregate the data into 
regions. These regressions will demonstrate the effect that private resource 
extraction has on the level of violence in Africa and Latin America separately. 
From this analysis I will be able to show if there is a difference, between the two 
regions, in the relationship between ownership of resource extraction and the 
level of violence. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the aim, purpose and projected analysis for this 
thesis. I have explained how I have collected data, and the reasons for doing 
so, for my independent, dependent and control variables. I have defined the 
reasons and process for the method of analysis adopted for this study and why 
these methods are most suitable for my dataset and what is being measured. I 
have also explained how I will conduct robustness tests that will show the 
strength of my results, whether they hold throughout, and the conditions under 
which they will support my hypotheses. Based on data from the UCDP, this 
research measures the level of violence and provides new data on natural 
resource ownership. Through a combination of bivariate and multivariate tests 
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this thesis will show how the type of ownership of natural resource extraction 
effects the level of violence a state may experience.   
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5. Analysis 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will describe how I have analysed my data to estimate the 
effect that ownership of natural resource extraction has on the severity of 
violence in states in Latin America and Africa from 1989-2014. First I will describe 
my data, and show some initial illustrations of my independent and dependent 
variables and how they interact with each other. Then I will show some 
bivariate hypothesis testing. Lastly, the chapter displays the results of ordinal 
logistic regression analysis that will enable me to illustrate whether we see a 
positive or negative relationship between the type of ownership and the level 
of violence. The analysis provided in this chapter will enable me to accept or 
reject my hypotheses. My first hypothesis predicts that countries with private 
extraction firms will experience low-level violence and extortion, my second 
hypothesis predicts that countries with state-owned extraction firms will be more 
likely to experience high-level violence and civil war onset. The results show that 
there is a negative relationship between private ownership, in both oil and gas 
extraction and mineral extraction, and the level of violence. The negative 
relationship illustrated in this chapter suggests that private extraction is likely to 
reduce the level of violence, while state-owned extraction is likely to increase 
the level of violence experienced. 
Description of Independent Variables 
My dataset can be shown in a manner of ways, but first, I will show some basic 
pie graphs to demonstrate the distribution of resource extraction ownership 
across my sample.  
 
	   69	  
 
 
Figure 1 - Ownership of Mineral Extraction 
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The First pie graph (Figure 1) shows the proportion of country-year observations 
for ownership of mineral extraction. From Figure 1 we can see that mineral 
extraction is dominated by private ownership with 49% of country-years 
exhibiting majority private ownership, compared to 15% state-owned mineral 
extraction and 36% with no mineral extraction in Latin America and Africa from 
1989 to 2014. The graph in Figure 2 shows the proportion of country-year 
observations for oil and gas extraction. From Figure 2 we can see that the 
ownership of oil and gas is relatively evenly distributed, when extraction occurs, 
between state-owned (15%), and privately owned (21%). However, we also see 
that 64% of country-year observations do not experience any oil and gas 
extraction in Latin America and Africa from 1989-2014. From Figure one and 
Figure two, we can see that mineral extraction is dominated by private 
ownership, whereas oil and gas has a relatively even distribution of ownership 
between private (21%) and state-owned (15%), when extraction occurs. 
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Figure 4 - Ownership of Oil and Gas Extraction in 1990 and 2014 
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of ownership of resource extraction in 1990 
compared with 2014. Figure 3 shows how mineral extraction has changed over 
time and we can see that the proportion of country-years with no mineral 
extraction decreased by four percentage points, state-owned extraction 
decreased from 25% to 10%, while privately owned mineral extraction 
increased from 39% to 58%. These changes suggest that some countries shifted 
from state-owned to private owned extraction, although some of the changes 
could be the result of new discoveries of mineral deposits by private firms. 
Figure 4 shows how oil and gas extraction has changed over time, with two pie 
graphs illustrating the distribution of oil and gas extraction ownership in 1990 
compared to 2014. In the graphs we see that there has been a 1-percentage 
point decrease in state-owned oil and gas extraction, from 18% in 1990 to 17% 
in 2014. Alternatively, we can see there are larger changes in the graphs for 
privately owned extraction and no extraction. We see a change from 12% 
privately owned extraction in 1990 to 28% in 2014, accompanied by the 
decrease from 70% in 1990 to 55% in 2014 of no extraction; this suggests that 
there has been a trend towards the private extraction of natural resources over 








No Oil and Gas Extraction Private Extraction
State-Owned Extraction
Graphs by year
Oil and Gas Extraction
	   72	  
time, let us look at how ownership differs across regions, from Latin America and 
Africa. 
 
Figure 5 - Ownership of Mineral Extraction in Latin America and Africa, All Years 
Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of mineral ownership in Latin America and 
Africa, and the distribution of oil and gas ownership in Latin America and Africa, 
respectively. From these graphs we can compare the distribution of ownership 
across the regions, to see if there is a difference in the structure of ownership in 
Latin America compared with Africa. Firstly, Figure 5 shows that Africa and Latin 
America share a similar make up of their mineral industries in terms of 
ownership. In years where there is no mineral extraction, Latin America shows 
that 30% of country-year observations have no mineral extraction, and 39% of 
country-years in Africa have no mineral extraction. We can see that there is a 
3% difference in state-owned mineral extraction, where in Latin America 14% of 
country-years have state-owned mineral extraction, compared with 17% of 
country-years in Africa. Additionally, there is an 8% difference in private 
ownership of mineral extraction, where 56% of country-years in Latin America 
have private mineral extraction, compared with 44% of country-years in Africa 
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ownership between the two regions suggests that the results for mineral 
extraction are unlikely to be driven by one region with heavily skewed data. 
 
Figure 6 - Ownership of Oil and Gas Extraction in Latin America and Africa, All Years 
Conversely, Figure 6 shows the distribution of oil and gas ownership in Latin 
America and Africa. Figure 6 shows that there are larger differences in the 
distribution of oil and gas ownership between regions and compared to mineral 
ownership. The largest difference between Latin America and Africa in Figure 6 
is the proportion of country-year observations with state-owned oil and gas 
extraction. In particular, we see 30% of country-year observations in Latin 
America have state-owned extraction, compared with 7% of country-year 
observations in Africa. Secondly, looking at the distribution of private oil and 
gas extraction, we see 18% of country-years in Latin America have private 
extraction, compared with 22% of country-years in Africa with private oil and 
gas extraction. And lastly, we see that Latin America has 52% of country-years 
with no oil and gas extraction compared with 71% of country-years in Africa 
with no oil and gas extraction.  
Overall, we see that the ownership of mineral extraction is relatively even across 
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Latin America. Additionally, for oil and gas extraction, a larger proportion of 
country-years in Latin America have state-owned oil and gas extraction 
compared to Africa. In both Figures, we see that more extraction occurs in 
Latin America, however these results could be skewed by the number of 
observations in each region, with 53 African countries, compared with 30 Latin 
American countries in my sample.  
Description of Dependent Variable 
In this section I will describe the dependent variable by illustrating what the 
data on the level of violence across my sample looks. First, I will show the 
distribution of fatalities across Africa and Latin America per year. Second, I 
describe the proportion of observations of resource ownership across the levels 
of violence. Figure 7 shows the distribution of fatalities across the years analysed 
in this study. The graph in Figure 7 illustrates that the year with the most fatalities 
was 1994, particularly in Africa; these results are likely to be driven by the 
Rwandan genocide. Additionally, the graph in Figure 7 shows a trend of higher 
number of fatalities from 1989 through to 2001, followed by a trend of low 
numbers off fatalities through to 2014. This trend suggests that conflict is 
reducing over time. Next I will describe the distribution of the type of ownership 
of resource extraction across the levels of violence, within the sample. 
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Figure 8 - Stacked Bar Graph of Ownership of Mineral Extraction and Level of Violence 
Figures 8 and 9 are stacked bar graphs, which show proportions of the levels of 
violence, by different types of extraction ownership. In the stacked bar graphs, 
the size of the bar is the proportion of observations, shown by the percentage 
written within the bar, followed by the number of observations in brackets. 
Firstly, Figure 8 shows the results for mineral extraction, and from this graph we 
can see that when a country-year experiences level 1 violence (1 on the y-axis) 
the majority of cases, 62.38%, have private mineral ownership (194 
observations). Alternatively, for level 6 violence, the larger proportion is taken 
up by no mineral extraction, with 36.93% (65) of observations, followed by state-
owned mineral extraction, with 32.39% (57) observations, closely followed by 
private ownership with 30.68% (54) observations. Overall from Figure 8 we can 
see that there are more observations with private ownership and level 1 and 
level 2 violence. This suggests support for my hypotheses; that private ownership 
is likely to experience lower-level violence, and state-owned extraction is likely 
to experience higher-levels of violence. The graph in Figure 8 also suggests that 
country-years are safest when private mineral extraction is present, as we can 
see with over 60% of observations that experience no recorded violence and 










































	   76	  
 
Figure 9 - Stacked Bar Graph of Ownership of Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
In contrast, Figure 9 shows the stacked bar graph for oil and gas ownership and 
violence. In this graph we see an increase in observations that do not have any 
oil and gas extraction. In particular, the distribution of observations for no 
violence recorded suggests that countries are safest with no oil and gas 
extraction. In Figure 9, looking at level 1 and level 6, we see a large proportion 
of cases having private ownership of oil and gas extraction, with 29.90% of 
observations at level 1 and 28.41% of observations at level 6. These graphs 
illustrate that there are cases where violence occurs in countries with both 
state-owned and privately owned resource extraction. Initially, we see that 
private extraction, both oil and gas and mineral, have a large proportion of 
observations with low-levels of violence, suggesting partial support for my 
hypotheses. However, the results for oil and gas ownership shows that no 
extraction is safer than having oil and gas extraction. In the following sections I 
will show how these variables interact further and what the relationship 
between resource ownership and the severity of violence a country may 
experience looks like.  
Bivariate Hypothesis Testing 
In this section I will conduct tabular analysis to show the relationship between 
my independent and dependent variables. The results from this analysis will 
show the statistical significance of the relationship is between the level of 
violence and the type of extraction ownership. Additionally, these tests will give 










































	   77	  
produced by chance. The results of the bivariate hypothesis tests will enable 
me to accept or reject the null hypothesis; that there is no relationship between 
the ownership of resource extraction and the level of violence a state may 
experience, given this data and the choice of analysis technique. I will start the 
bivariate testing by showing the tabular analysis for mineral extraction, starting 
with describing the table comparing observations of extraction with no 
extraction across the levels of violence. Following the table that shows the 
relationship between resource extraction in general with the levels of violence, I 
will structure the analysis by the type of resources being extracted, starting with 
the analysis of the ownership of mineral extraction and violence, followed by 
an analysis of the ownership of oil and gas extraction and the levels of 
violence. Within each section I will show the tabular analysis for no extraction 
compared to private, followed by the analysis for no extraction compared to 
state-owned extraction. And finally, I will show the analysis for private ownership 
compared to state-owned extraction for minerals and then for oil and gas.  
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Table 5-1 Chi2 Table of Resource Extraction and Level of Violence 
 
Table 1 shows the tabular analysis of resource extraction in general across the 
levels of violence. This table shows the number of observations for every 
possible outcome of severity of violence, the proportion of country-year 
observations for each level of violence and whether there is resource extraction 
or not. First, we see that there are a total of 979 observations within the dataset 
for the level of violence, of these observations, 172 observations, or 17.57%, 
occur in country years with no resource extraction, and 807 observations, or 
82.43%, occur in country-years with some form of resource extraction. Second, 
let us look at the distribution of observations where there is no resource 
extraction and the level of violence experienced. In the column for no 
extraction in Table 1, we see that 6.40% of no extraction observations do not 
experience any violence, 31.40% of observations experience level 1 violence, 
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for extraction, we see that 9.54% of observations with some form of resource 
extraction experience no violence, 31.85% of observations experience level 1 
violence and 16.23% of observations experience level 6 violence. These results 
show that when a country-year has no resource extraction, the most common 
outcome of violence experienced is level 1 violence (31.40%), closely followed 
by level 6 violence (26.16%). Similarly, when there is some form of resource 
extraction, the most common outcome for the level of violence is level 1 
(31.85%) followed by level 6 violence (16.23%). This suggests that there is not a 
strong relationship between extraction in general and the severity of violence. 
In order to analyse each level of violence and whether it is more likely to occur 
under resource extraction or under no extraction, we should look across rows at 
the proportion of observations for each level of violence. First, looking at the 
row for no violence, we see that 87.50% of observations occur when there is 
also some form of resource extraction. When level 1 violence occurs, we see 
that 82.64% of observations also have some form of resource extraction. Table 1 
shows a trend where the proportion of observations for resource extraction 
gradually decreases as the level of violence increases. In comparison, the trend 
for the proportion of observations for no resource extraction gradually increases 
as the level of violence increases. Throughout the rows in Table 1, the majority 
of observations occur when there is some form of resource extraction; this 
suggests that, no resource extraction is less likely to experience any level of 
violence compared to when there is resource extraction. Additionally, the p-
value for this analysis is 0.034, which suggests that these results are significant, 
and unlikely to be the product of random chance. Overall, Table 1 shows that 
the safest option, between no resource extraction and extraction of some form, 
is no extraction.  
Mineral Extraction 
In this section I discuss the tabular analysis of mineral ownership and the severity 
of violence. I will compare private ownership to no extraction, then state-
owned with no extraction, and finally comparing private mineral extraction with 
state-owned mineral extraction. Table 2 shows the tabular analysis of private 
mineral extraction and the level of violence, we see that there are a total of 
705 observations within this analysis, showing 172 (24.40%) observations of no 
extraction, and 533 (75.60%) observations of private mineral extraction across 
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the levels of violence. First, looking at the column for no resource extraction, we 
see the same proportions shown in table 1, and looking at the column for 
private mineral extraction, we see that 10.13% of observations experience no 
violence, 36.40% experience level 1 violence, 19.14% experience level 4 
violence, and 10.13% experience level 6 violence. The results from these 
columns show that when there is private extraction, the most common violence 
outcome is level 1, followed by level 4, and level 6 violence shares the same 
proportion of observations as no violence.  
Table 5-2 Chi2 Table of Private Mineral Extraction and Level of Violence 
 
Second, I will analyse the levels of violence, and whether no extraction or 
private mineral extraction experiences more high or low-level violence. When 
looking at the row for no violence, 16.92% of observations have no resource 
extraction, and 83.08% of observations have private mineral extraction. Figure 
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private mineral extraction, at each level of violence. In Table 2, we see that the 
majority of observations across almost all levels of violence occur in country-
years with private mineral extraction, which shows that private mineral 
extraction is more common than no resource extraction. However, as the level 
of violence increases to level 6, we see that no resource extraction becomes 
more common, as shown in Figure 10. Therefore, these results suggest that lower 
levels of violence are more likely to occur in country-years with private mineral 
extraction, and that higher levels of violence are experienced almost equally in 
country-years with no resource extraction, as in country-years with private 
mineral extraction. Overall, this suggests that private mineral extraction 
decreases the relative risk of high-levels of violence. Additionally, these results 
are statistically significant, as shown by the p-value of 0.000 in Table 2; this 
suggests that the outcomes are not a result of random chance. 
 
Figure 10 - Line graph of Private Mineral Extraction and Level of Violence 
Table 3 shows the tabular analysis of no resource extraction and state-owned 
mineral extraction across the levels of violence. In this table, there are a total of 
357 observations, where 48.18% are observations with no resource extraction, 
and 51.82% are observations with state-owned resource extraction. Already in 
this analysis we have a relatively even distribution of observations with no 
resource extraction and with state-owned mineral extraction. First I will outline 
the distribution of state-owned observations across the levels of violence. 
Looking at the column for state-owned mineral extraction, we see that 9.73% of 
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and 30.81% experience level 6 violence. From the column results, we see that 
when there is state-owned mineral extraction, level 6 violence is the most likely 
outcome, followed by level 1 violence. However, the p-value from this table 
does not show statistical significance.  
Table 5-3 Chi2 Table State-Owned Mineral Extraction and Level of violence 
 
Next, I will analyse whether state-owned mineral extraction or no extraction is 
more likely to experience each level of violence, by comparing the proportions 
across the rows of Table 3, also illustrated in Figure 11. First, when looking at 
observations that do not experience any violence, we see that 37.93% do not 
have any resource extraction, and 62.07% have state-owned mineral 
extraction. As shown in Figure 11, the trend for state-owned mineral extraction 
and no resource, extraction across the levels of violence, is not as straight 
forward as the trend between private mineral extraction and no resource 






































	   83	  
level 6 violence, the majority of observations have state-owned mineral 
extraction. In comparison, no resource extraction has the majority of 
observations for level 1 and level 5 violence, and for level 3 violence, it is a 
50:50 split for no resource extraction and state-owned mineral extraction. Figure 
11 and Table 3 illustrate that countries with either no resource extraction or 
state-owned mineral extraction experience all levels of violence relatively 
equally. The analysis here suggests that state-owned mineral extraction is about 
as ‘dangerous’ as no resource extraction, therefor is does not increase or 
decrease the overall risk. This analysis shows the likely levels of violence when 
there is no extraction, compared to state-owned mineral extraction, the next 
analysis will show a comparison of mineral extraction ownership, and will show if 
private or state-owned experiences high-level or low-level violence.  
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Table 5-4 Chi2 Table Mineral Ownership and Level of Violence 
 
The tabular analysis in Table 4 shows how the observations of state-owned and 
privately owned mineral extraction are distributed across the levels of violence. 
The p-value for this analysis shows that the results are statistically significant, and 
are unlikely to be the result of random chance. Firstly, Table 4 shows that 25.77% 
of the observations are country-years that have state-owned mineral 
extraction, and 74.23% are country-years with private mineral extraction, this 
shows it is more common for there to be private mineral extraction than state-
owned mineral extraction. Now to discuss the levels of violence and the 
ownership of mineral extraction illustrated in Figure 12, we see that private 
mineral extraction has the larger proportion of observations at every level of 
violence with the exception of level 6. The proportion of observations that 
experience level 6 violence is almost evenly distributed, with 51.35% having 
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shows the trend for the proportion of observations for private mineral extraction 
is steady, with a sharp decrease when experiencing level 6 violence, this 
suggests that the risk of level 6 violence is less when mineral extraction is 
privately owned, and more risk when mineral extraction is state-owned. 
Therefore, this analysis shows that observations with private mineral extraction 
are at a higher risk of experiencing level 1 violence. However, the change in in 
proportions of observations at level 6 violence, shows that observations with 
state-owned mineral extraction are at a higher risk of experiencing level 6 
violence, and private ownership is at a lower risk of experiencing level 6 
violence. 
 
Figure 12 - Line graph of Mineral Ownership and Level of Violence 
Lastly in this section, I will use Figure 13 to show all the possible outcomes for the 
levels of violence and mineral extraction within my sample - no extraction, 
private mineral extraction and state-owned mineral extraction. The results show 
that for each level of violence measured in this analysis, that the higher 
proportions of observations have private mineral extraction, with the exception 
of level 6 violence. In Figure 13 we see a trend where the proportion of 
observations is steady across all levels of violence, until we reach level 5 and 
level 6 violence. At the lower levels of violence, we see that observations with 
private mineral extraction are at the highest risk of experiencing level 1 
violence, compared to state-owned mineral extraction and no extraction. 
Additionally, looking at level 2 violence, again, we see that private mineral 













	   86	  
the lowest risk of experiencing level 2 violence. The change in observations at 6 
shows in particular shows that observations with state-owned mineral extraction 
is at a higher risk of experiencing level 6 violence, followed by private mineral 
extraction, with no extraction being at the lowest risk of experiencing level 6 
violence. Therefore, the graph in Figure 13 suggests that the most peaceful 
option (negative peace) of mineral extraction – the one least likely to 
experience any violent conflict – is private mineral extraction. The trends shown 
in Figure 13 suggest that private mineral extraction has the highest risk of 
experiencing level 1 violence and that state-owned mineral extraction is at the 
highest risk of experiencing level 6 violence Therefore, the results suggest 
support for my hypotheses; that private extraction is more likely to experience 
low-level violence. Additionally, Figure 13 suggests that there is not a lot of 
difference between state-owned mineral extraction and no violence and the 
risk of violence, as shown by the lines the represent no extraction and state-
owned being so close together in the graph. 
 
Figure 13 - Line graph of Mineral Ownership with No Extraction across Levels of Violence 
Oil and Gas Extraction 
In this section I will discuss the tabular analysis of oil and gas ownership, in order 
to compare the results with the analysis of mineral ownership, and further test 
my hypotheses on ownership of resource extraction and the severity of 
violence. First I will compare no extraction with private oil and gas extraction, 
followed by a comparison between no extraction and state-owned extraction, 

















	   87	  
extraction. In each table I will show how the distribution of each type of oil and 
gas ownership is spread across the levels of violence.  
Table 5 shows the tabular analysis of no extraction, private oil and gas 
extraction and the levels of violence. Each column in the table shows the 
observations for no oil and gas extraction, and private oil and gas extraction. At 
the bottom of the table, in the ‘total’ row, we see that in this sample there are 
172 (39.81%) observations with no extraction and 260 (60.19%) observations with 
private oil and gas extraction. First, looking down the columns for no extraction, 
we see that 6.40% of observations experience no violence, 31.40% experience 
level 1 violence, and 26.16% of observations experience level 6 violence. 
Looking down the column for private oil and gas extraction, we see a similar 
pattern, with 7.31% of observations experiencing no violence, 35.77% 
experiencing level 1 violence, and 19.23% experiencing level 6 violence. The 
pattern of level 1 and level 6 violence sharing the highest, and second highest 
proportion of observations for each type of extraction (none and private oil 
and gas) shows that the most common levels of violence and low-level (level 1) 
and high-level (level 6). 
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Table 5-5 Chi2 Table of Private Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
 
Next, I will compare the proportion of observations of no extraction and private 
oil and gas extraction across each level of violence. Shown in Table 5, and 
illustrated in Figure 14, we see that there is a pattern across all the levels, with 
the exception of levels 5 and 6. When country-year experience no violence, 
level 1, level 2, level 3, and level 4 violence, no extraction shares around 30% of 
the observations, and private oil and gas extraction shares around 60% of the 
observations. At level 5 violence, we see that 53.33% of observations have no 
extraction, and 46.67% of observations have private oil and gas extraction. At 
level 6 violence, we see that 47.37% of observations have no extraction, and 
52.63% of observations have private oil and gas extraction. The trends observed 
in Figure 14 suggest that private oil extraction is at the highest risk of low-level 
violence, with a decrease in the risk of level 5 and level 6 violence. Figure 14 
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experiencing level 5 violence. The results of this analysis show that there are 
more country-years that have private oil and gas extraction, and that oil and 
gas extraction in general increases the risk of conflict onset.  
 
Figure 14 - Line graph Private Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
The second analysis in this section looks at state-owned oil and gas extraction in 
comparison to no extraction, and the level of violence. In Table 6 we can see 
that the column for no extraction shows 52.28% of the observations within the 
sample, and the column for state-owned oil extraction has 47.72% of the 
observations. Looking down the column for state-owned oil and gas extraction, 
we see that 3.82% of the observations experience no violence, 21.02% 
experience level 1 violence, 15.29% experience level 2 violence, 20.38% 
experience level 4 violence and 19.11% experience level 6 violence. The results 
from the state-owned oil and gas extraction column show that the most 
common results are level 1, 4 and 6. Additionally, at the bottom of Table 6 we 
see that the p-value shows the results in this table are statistically significant, 
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Table 5-6 Chi2 Table State-Owned Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
 
In order to discuss whether state-owned oil and gas extraction has a higher risk 
of experiencing low or high levels of violence, we need to compare it to cases 
with no resource extraction. Figure 15 illustrates the results from Table 6, showing 
the proportions of observations for no extraction and state-owned oil and gas 
extraction, across each level of violence. From Figure 15 we can see that the 
both no extraction and state-owned oil and gas extraction experience different 
levels of violence. In particular, we see that more observations with state-
owned extraction experience levels 2, 3 and 4 violence, while observations with 
no extraction experience no violence, level 1 and level 6 violence more than 
state-owned. The results from this analysis show that no extraction is more likely 
to experience no violence more than state-owned oil and gas extraction. 
Therefore, from Figure 15, we see that state-owned oil and gas extraction is at a 
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Figure 15 shows that state-owned oil and gas extraction has a higher risk of 
experiencing level 2, and level 4 violence, and has a lower risk, than no 
extraction, of experiencing level 6 violence.  
 
Figure 15 - Line Graph of State-Owned Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
So far we have discussed privately owned and state-owned oil and gas 
extraction in relation to no resource extraction; the third tabular analysis of oil 
and gas extraction will compare privately owned oil and gas extraction with 
state-owned oil and gas extraction across the levels of violence. The analysis 
from Table 7 will show us what levels of violence state-owned oil and gas, and 
private oil and gas extraction are more likely to experience. The p-value, shown 
at the bottom of Table 7, shows that the results produced in this table are 
statistically significant, and not likely to be the product of random chance. 
Table 7 shows that 37.65% of observations have state-owned oil and gas 
extraction, and 62.35% have private oil and gas extraction. We already know 
how each type of ownership is distributed over the levels of violence (looking 
down the columns), now we will look at the distribution of each level of 
violence, across either state-owned oil and gas extraction, or private oil and 
gas extraction. Table 7, and Figure 16, show that when there is no violence, 
private extraction occurs in 76.00% of observations, and 24.00% in observations 
with state-owned oil and gas extraction. Additionally, when level 6 violence is 
experienced, 62.50% of observations have private oil and gas extraction, and 
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see that no violence is more common when there is private oil and gas 
extraction, but also level 6 violence is more common with private oil and gas.  
Table 5-7 Chi2 Table Ownership of Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
 
Figure 16 shows that the risk of violence changes across all levels. First, we see 
that private oil and gas extraction has a high risk of experiencing low-level 
violence, and state-owned oil and gas extraction has a low risk of experiencing 
low-level violence. Second, we see that the risk of violence for state-owned oil 
and gas extraction increases for level 2 violence, and again for level 5 violence. 
However, this graph shows that for level 6 violence, private oil and gas 
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Figure 16 - Line Graph Ownership of Oil and Gas Extraction and Level of Violence 
	  
 
Figure 17 - Line graph of Oil and Gas Ownership with No Extraction across Levels of Violence 
Lastly, Figure 17 illustrates the proportion of observations for no extraction, state-
owned oil and gas, and private oil and gas extraction across the level of 
violence. This graph shows that when there is no violence, private extraction is 
most common, followed by no extraction, and state-owned extraction being 
the least common result, level 1 violence reflects much the same result as no 
violence. When level 6 violence is experienced, the most common result is still 
private extraction, followed by no extraction, and then stat-owned extraction, 
but the differences in these proportions is very small. Therefore, in Figure, we see 
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are at a higher risk of experiencing low-level violence, compared to state-
owned oil and gas extraction, and compared to no resource extraction. These 
results show support for my hypothesis; the private ownership of resource 
extraction is more likely to experience low-level violence. Furthermore, for 
private oil and gas extraction, we see that the risk of violence decreases from 
no violence towards level 6, as shown by the slope of the line. The trend for 
state-owned oil and gas extraction shows that it has the lowest risk of 
experiencing level 1 violence, and as the level of violence increases the risk for 
state-owned oil and gas extraction also increases. However, when oil and gas 
extraction is state-owned, the level of violence that is has the highest risk of 
experiencing is level 2. Additionally, the results for high-levels of violence show 
that private extraction is the most common outcome at level 6 violence, closely 
followed by no extraction, and then state-owned extraction sharing around 
24% of the observations. This shows support for my hypotheses, because the 
relative risk of violence for private oil and gas decreases as the level increases, 
and the risk of violence increased for state-owned oil and gas, while the level of 
violence increases.  
The tables analysed above form my hypothesis tests where I have provided an 
insight into the relationship between my independent variable, the ownership 
of resource extraction, and dependent variable, the level of violence 
experienced. The tabular analysis has shown that there is partial support for my 
hypotheses, in particular for private resource extraction and low-level violence. 
In the next section I will test whether the relationships introduced in the bivariate 
hypothesis tests hold when controlling for other factors that could contribute to 
alternative explanations of the correlations. The Pearson Chi squared tests 
conducted in this section allow me to see what the data looks like when the 
dependent and independent variables interact. The following ordinal 
regressions will allow me to continue to investigate the relationship between 
resource extraction ownership and the level of violence experienced.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression 
Ordinal Logistic Regression is a method that will allow me to show the statistical 
significance of the relationship between ownership of resource extraction and 
the level of violence experienced by countries, while controlling for other 
factors that may represent alternative explanations. In the tests that follow I 
	   95	  
start by only looking at cases where some form of resource extraction occurs, 
where private and state-owned extraction are mutually exclusive categories. 
As a part of the robustness tests I will use no extraction as a comparison to test if 
the relationships illustrated in this section continue to hold. Additionally, these 
tests will show, firstly, the direction of the relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables. Secondly, the results produced in this section will 
allow me to accept or reject my hypotheses; that private ownership of 
extraction is likely to experience low-level violence, and state-owned resource 
extraction will experience high-level violence. Thirdly, the results will enable me 
to discuss the implications of the results in the next chapter of this thesis. In this 
section I have conducted two batteries of ordinal logistic regression, one for 
ownership of mineral extraction, and a second battery for the ownership of oil 
and gas extraction. In the two batteries I have controlled for; the mineral rents 
as a percentage of GDP for mineral ownership and oil and gas rents as a 
percentage of GDP for oil and gas ownership, GDP per capita, and the polity 
score (Collier & Hoefffler, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Marshall et al., 2014; The 
World Bank, 2015).  
Table 5-8 The Effect of Mineral Extraction on Level of Violence 
 
First, I will analyse mineral extraction, Table 8 shows the ordinal logistic regression 
of Private mineral extraction when controlling for Mineral rents as a percentage 
of GDP, Polity and the log of GDP per capita. This regression is an analysis of 
country-years where there is some mineral extraction. The coefficient value in 
this output shows a strong negative relationship with a confident p-value. The 
results in this table estimate that with a one-unit increase from no private 
mineral extraction to private mineral extraction (in country-years with some 
mineral extraction) there is likely to be a decrease in the level of violence 
experienced. This suggests that the level of violence will decrease when there is 
a private mineral extraction firm present. Additionally, because this regression 
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ownership with the independent variable for state-owned mineral extraction, 
we would see the same result, but with a positive coefficient. Therefore, the 
results show that we are more likely to see an increase in the level of violence 
when mineral extraction is state-owned, and a decrease in levels of violence 
for privately owned mineral extraction.  
The second battery performed (Table 9) shows the ordinal logistic regression of 
private oil and gas extraction. This regression controls for oil and gas rents as a 
percentage of GDP, Polity and lagged GDP per capita in country-years where 
there is oil and gas extraction occurring. In Table 9 the coefficient shows that 
with a one-unit increase towards private oil and gas extraction (in country-years 
where there is oil and gas extraction) we are likely to see a decrease in the 
level of violence experienced. The results, shown in table 9, show a significant 
negative coefficient for private oil and gas extraction. This suggests that 
violence is likely to decrease when a private firm is extracting oil and gas. 
Additionally, if it were a state owned oil and gas firm, violence would be likely 
to increase by the same margin. 
Table 5-9 The Effect of Oil and Gas Ownership of Level of Violence 
 
The results from both batteries of the ordinal logistic regressions show significant 
p-value results, as shown by the asterisks. We see in both Tables that the 
coefficients for private mineral and private oil and gas extraction display three 
asterisks, meaning the p-values were less than 0.001. The significant p-values 
suggest that we can confidently reject hypothesis that private resource 
extraction has no relationship with levels of violence. The results provided in the 
above regressions show significant results that support my hypotheses; that 
private extraction will experience low-level violence, and state-owned 
extraction will experience high-level violence. Therefore, I will move on to some 








	   97	  
above, and enable me to see if the relationship could be driven by alternative 
explanations.  
Robustness Tests 
In this section I will analyse a number of test outputs that will assess the 
robustness of my results from the initial ordinal logistic regression. If the results 
from the initial multivariate regression continue to hold then the evidence 
continues to support my hypotheses that countries with private mineral 
extraction and/or private oil and gas extraction are more likely to experience 
low-level violence, and that countries with state-owned extraction are likely to 
experience high-level violence and civil war onset. Additionally, the results from 
these robustness tests may also provide more insight into how the interaction 
between level of violence and ownership of resource extraction may change, 
when introduced to additional controls, and tests. Firstly I will conduct an 
ordinal logistic regression with additional control variables to test the strength of 
my initial results for private mineral extraction and then private oil and gas 
extraction. Secondly, I will conduct a multinomial logistic regression to show the 
interaction between ownership of resource extraction and the different levels 
of violence, treating different levels of violence as independent categories. 
Third, I will repeat an ordinal logistic regression and a multinomial logistic 
regression, in order to analyse the relationship between private and state-
owned resource extraction with the level of violence against no resource 
extraction. Lastly, I will conduct another ordinal logistic regression, comparing 
Africa with Latin America. This will show whether there is a difference in the 
relationship between ownership of resource extraction and the level of 
violence in African countries compared to Latin American countries, and 
whether the results so far are driven by a strong relationship in one region, and 
a weak relationship in the other. 
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Ordinal Logistic Regression with Additional Controls 
Table 5-10 Ordinal Logistic Regression All Controls 
 
Table 10 shows the ordinal logistic regressions for private mineral extraction, 
represented in the column for Model 1, and private oil and gas extraction, 
represented by the column for Model 2. In these regressions I have controlled 
for Unemployment and year in addition to the original controls; resource rents 
as a percentage of GDP (mineral rents for mineral extraction and oil and gas 
rents for oil and gas extraction), Polity and lagged GDP per capita. Table 10 
shows that for a one-unit increase to private mineral extraction (in country-years 
with mineral extraction) we could expect a decrease in the level of violence. 
Additionally, in Model 2, the model for private oil and gas extraction, we see 
that for a one-unit increase to private oil and gas extraction (in country-years 
with oil and gas extraction) we expect to see a decrease in the level of 
violence. These results suggest that violence is likely to decrease when there is 
private extraction, and shows generally larger coefficients than those 
produced in Tables 8 and 9. 
In Addition, the results in Table 10 show significant p-value results, for both 
batteries, for private mineral extraction, and for private oil and gas extraction. 
We can see that the p-values are less than 0.001 for both private mineral 
extraction and private oil and gas extraction. Therefore, we can confidently 
reject the null hypotheses that there is no relationship between private 
ownership and low-level violence, and that there is no relationship between 
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Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Table 5-11 Multinomial Logistic Regression Levels of Violence and Ownership of 
Extraction 
 
Secondly, Table 11 shows the multinomial logistic regression of the adjusted 
levels of violence for ownership of mineral extraction (Model 1) and oil and gas 
extraction (Model 2), where the comparative category is no violence. The level 
of violence in this test is measured as follows; low-level violence refers to 
country-years that experience from 1 to 24 fatalities, medium-level violence 
refers to country-years that experience from 25 to 999 fatalities and high-level 
violence refers to country-years which experience over 1000 fatalities3. Firstly, 
looking at Model 1, these results show the relationship between private mineral 
extraction and the level of violence, in particular, it tells us what is likely to 
happen to the level of violence when we have a one-unit shift towards private 
mineral extraction (in country-years with mineral extraction). The most 
significant output in this battery is for high-level violence, where the results show 
a significant decrease in the likelihood of the highest levels of violence 
occurring. The relationship described by this result suggests that in country-years 
where there is private mineral extraction, we are expected to see a decrease 
in the level of violence, most prominently away from high-level violence.  
Table 11 examines Model 2, private oil and gas extraction, and the relationship 
with the levels of violence. The coefficients show a negative relationship across 
all levels, with the largest effect at medium level violence, which suggests that 
we can expect violence to decrease away from medium level violence by 
when there is a one-unit increase to private oil and gas extraction. This 
coefficient, accompanied by the asterisks, shows that the p-value was less than 
0.05 meaning that I can confidently reject that private oil and gas extraction is 
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not related to medium level violence. Therefore, the relationship described in 
Model 2 shows support for my hypotheses that countries with private extraction 
are likely to experience low-level violence, and countries with state-owned 
extraction are likely to experience high-level violence.  
No Extraction as a Comparison 
In the analysis tables in this section I will be describing what the relationship 
looks like when comparing private and state-owned extraction to no 
extraction. First I will describe the relationship of mineral extraction, followed by 
oil and gas extraction. I will then go on to describe the relationship between 
private and state-owned extraction for each level of violence through the 
multinomial logistic regression. This analysis will enable me to show how the 
severity of violence is affected when there is no extraction compared to either 
private or state-owned extraction.  
Table 5-12 Ordinal Logistic Regression Levels of Violence State and Private Mineral Extraction 
 
Table 12 shows the regression for mineral extraction. The coefficient for private 
mineral extraction shows that when a country-year moves from no extraction to 
private mineral extraction, the likelihood of higher levels of violence increases. 
In comparison, the coefficient for state-owned mineral extraction shows that 
when a country-year moves from no extraction to state-owned mineral 
extraction, the likelihood of higher levels of violence increases, significantly 
more than when there is private mineral extraction. The results in Table 12 
continue to show support for my hypotheses; we see that the outcome for 
state-owned mineral extraction shows statistically significant results and a large 
coefficient, which suggest that when there is state-owned mineral extraction, 
the level of violence is likely to increase to high-level violence. The table 
showing the multinomial regression will show us more information on each level 
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Table 5-13 Ordinal Logistic Regression Level of Violence and Private and State Oil and Gas 
Extraction 
 
Table 13 shows the ordinal logistic regression for oil and gas ownership, and how 
the level of violence is likely to change when a country-year moves from no oil 
and gas extraction to either private or state-owned oil and gas extraction. This 
regression shows that when a country-year moves from no extraction to private 
oil and gas extraction, the likelihood of higher levels of violence increases, but 
to a smaller extent than state-owned oil and gas extraction. Additionally, when 
the move is from no extraction to state-owned extraction, we are likely to see a 
significant increase in the likelihood of higher levels of violence. The results for 
both private and state-owned oil and gas extraction show statistical 
significance, which suggests that I can reject the null hypothesis, that the 
ownership of oil and gas extraction is not related to the level of violence.  
Table 5-14 Multinomial Logistic Regression Levels of Violence and Private and State Owned 
Extraction 
 
Table 14 shows the multinomial logistic regression for each level of violence, 
and the ownership of mineral extraction in Model 1 and the ownership of oil 
and gas extraction in Model 2. This graph shows the relationship between each 
level of violence, where the comparative category is no violence, and how 
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we can see that mineral extraction (Model 1) has a negative relationship with 
all levels of violence, for both private and state-owned. In comparison, when 
looking at Model 2, for oil and gas extraction, we see a positive relationship at 
all levels of violence, which suggests support for my hypotheses. Within Model 1, 
we see that there are two statistically significant relationships, first between 
state-owned mineral extraction and low-level violence, and second, between 
private mineral extraction and high-level violence. The significant results for 
Model 1 suggest that when there is a shift from no extraction to state-owned 
extraction low-level violence is likely to decrease, while when there is a shift 
from no extraction to private mineral extraction, we are likely to see a large 
decrease in high-level violence. The results from Model 1 suggest that high-level 
violence is highly unlikely when there is private mineral extraction, and that low-
level violence is not likely when there is state-owned mineral extraction. 
Model 2 from Table 14 shows the relationship between oil and gas ownership 
and the levels of violence. First, we see that there are two statistically significant 
results for state-owned oil and gas extraction, at medium-level violence, and at 
high-level violence. Table 14 shows that when there is a shift from no extraction 
to state-owned oil and gas extraction, we are likely to see a 1.444 unit increase 
in medium-level violence, and a 1.188 unit increase in high-level violence. These 
results show strong support for my hypothesis, that state-owned extraction is 
more likely to experience high-level violence. The results from Table 14 suggest 
that high-level violence is unlikely when there is private mineral extraction, and 
that low-level violence is unlikely when there is state-owned mineral extraction. 
Additionally, the results suggest that when there is state-owned oil and gas 
extraction, medium and high-level violence is likely. 
Regional Comparison 
Finally, Table 15 shows the ordinal logistic regressions for private mineral 
extraction and private oil and gas extraction, divided into African cases, and 
Latin American cases. In Table 15 Model 1 represents the regression for private 
mineral extraction in country-years where mineral extraction occurs, in Africa, 
Model 2 represents the regression for private oil and gas (in country-years where 
oil and gas extraction occurs) in Africa, Model 3 represents the regression for 
private mineral extraction (in country-years where mineral extraction occurs) in 
Latin America, and Model 4 represents the regression for private oil and gas 
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extraction (in country-years where oil and gas extraction occurs) in Latin 
America.  
Table 5-15 Ordinal Logistic Regression Comparing regions 
 
The results from these regressions show that there is a significant negative 
relationship between private mineral extraction in Africa and the level of 
violence, meaning that when there is a one-unit increase to private mineral 
extraction we should expect a 1.105 unit decrease in the level of violence, in 
Africa. Alternatively, the regression for private mineral extraction in Latin 
America shows a positive relationship between private mineral extraction and 
the level of violence, meaning that when there is a one-unit increase to private 
mineral extraction, we should expect a 0.144 increase in the level of violence. 
These results suggest that the strong negative relationship between private 
mineral extraction and the level of violence in the regression in Table 8 above 
could be driven by the strong relationship we see between level of violence 
and private mineral extraction in Africa.  
Additionally, the regressions in Table 15 for private oil and gas extraction both 
show strong negative relationships between private oil and gas extraction and 
the level of violence for both Africa and Latin America. In Model 2 we see that 
with a one-unit increase to private oil and gas extraction in Africa, we are likely 
to see a 0.371 decrease in the level of violence. In Model 4 we see a stronger 
relationship, which shows that with a one-unit increase to private oil and gas 
extraction in Latin America, we are likely to see a 2.890 decrease in the level of 
violence. The difference between these two regressions suggests that the initial 
regression in Table 9 could be driven by the strong result for the relationship 
Africa Latin*America
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between private oil and gas extraction and the level of violence in Latin 
America.  
The results from Table 15 demonstrate how ownership of resource extraction 
interacts with the levels of violence a state is likely to experience, and how the 
relationship can change from African countries to Latin American countries. The 
results for Model 1 and Model 4 show significant p-values, as both represent p-
values of less than 0.001, suggesting that I can confidently reject the hypothesis 
that private mineral extraction in Model 1 and private oil and gas extraction in 
Model 4 are related to the level of violence by chance. Therefore, these results 
indicate that support for my hypotheses are stronger for private mineral 
extraction in Africa, and stronger for private oil and gas extraction in Latin 
America. 
The Robustness tests conducted above demonstrate the strength of the 
relationship between ownership of resource extraction and level of violence. 
The results, throughout the ordinal logistic regressions and the multinomial 
logistic regression, held and in some cases were strengthened. The robustness 
tests have provided more insight into the relationship between ownership of 
resource extraction and the level of violence countries experience. The results 
continue to show support for my hypotheses, with regard to private ownership 
of resource extraction and low-levels of violence, and with regard to state-
owned extraction and high-level violence. We also observe an intriguing 
difference in the relationships between oil and gas extraction and the level of 
violence and mineral extraction and the level of violence, and how these 
relationships differ depending on the region, this will be discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter.  
Summary 
The analysis provided in this chapter has enabled me to describe the 
relationship between the ownership of resource extraction and the level of 
violence a state experiences. The results from the regressions show support for 
my hypotheses for both mineral extraction and oil and gas extraction. I have 
provided results that show that private resource extraction has a strong 
relationship with low-levels of violence, particularly with oil and gas extraction, 
which shows stronger coefficients than those produced for mineral extraction. I 
provided further analysis of the relationship between privately owned resource 
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extraction from the robustness tests, where I show that private mineral 
ownership is unlikely to experience high level violence. Furthermore, the results 
show that state-owned mineral extraction has a strong relationship with higher-
levels of violence. In particular, through the robustness tests we see that state-
owned mineral extraction is unlikely to experience low-level violence, and 
state-owned oil and gas extraction is very likely to experience high-level 
violence. Additionally, as a result of the robustness tests we observe that the 
relationships differ between Africa and Latin America; where we see a strong 
negative relationship between private mineral extraction and the level of 
violence in Africa, and a strong negative relationship between private oil and 
gas extraction and the level of violence in Latin America. The results produced 
in this analysis are robust, because the results held, and were strengthened 
during the robustness tests. The specificity of the hypotheses proposed in this 
thesis opened a path to numerous alternative explanations and outcomes, 
however, despite the opportunities to be proven wrong, the results support my 
hypotheses. I will discuss the implications of these results for countries, 
companies and organisation, in more detail in the following chapter. 
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6. Discussion 
Introduction 
In this Chapter I will outline and interpret the results produced in the previous 
chapter, and discuss the results in relation to my two hypotheses and theory. I 
will conclude this chapter with a discussion of the position of my findings within 
the literature on natural resources and conflict, and outline areas for further 
research. In this thesis I have reviewed the literature that analyses the 
relationships between natural resources and violence. Accordingly, from the 
literature review, I identified that research has generally not yet examined the 
effect that the ownership structure of natural resource exploitation has on 
conflict outcomes. The theoretical framework provided in this thesis enabled 
the design of two specific hypotheses:  
H1: Countries with private extraction firms will experience low-level violence 
and extortion in an attempt by groups to redress grievances. 
H2: Countries with state-owned extraction firms will be more likely to experience 
high-level violence and the onset of civil war. 
From the hypotheses, I formulated and designed empirical tests to investigate 
the nature of the relationship between ownership of resource extraction and 
the level of violence states experience. By testing the relationship between 
these two variables I have produced results that show support for my 
hypotheses. I analysed a new dataset of the ownership structure of natural 
resource extraction in Africa and Latin America 1989-2014. The results from the 
regression analysis produced in the previous chapter show support for both 
hypotheses produced in this thesis, regarding the ownership of natural resource 
extraction and the severity of violence. 
In this chapter I intend to discuss my interpretations of the results, and the 
implications of my findings. Firstly I will interpret and explain what the results from 
the previous chapter mean for my hypotheses, and provide answers for my 
research question. Secondly I will discuss how these findings fit into the literature 
and theories of natural resources and conflict. Finally, I will provide suggestions 
for future research, based on the limitations and scope of this study and my 
findings.  
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Results 
The tests conducted within the previous chapter, have shown an insight into the 
relationships between private and state-owned resource extraction in regard to 
mineral extraction, and oil and gas extraction. The results from the ordinal 
logistic regressions demonstrate that there is a strong and significant negative 
relationship between private resource extraction and the level of violence. 
Furthermore, the results for private oil and gas showed larger estimates than 
those produced for private mineral extraction. The strong negative relationships 
shown for private resource extraction are mirrored by the results for state-
owned extraction. We see significant positive relationships between state-
owned extraction and the level of violence. The relationships described in the 
results suggest that the level of violence is likely to decrease when we have 
private resource extraction, and likely to increase when we have state-owned 
resource extraction, given that there is some form of resource extraction 
occurring. Therefore, these results support my hypotheses.   
Ordinal Logistic Regression Results 
In the Analysis chapter I executed a number of logistic regressions to examine 
the relationship between the ownership of resource extraction and the level of 
violence. I have disaggregated the effects for mineral extraction and oil and 
gas extraction, in order to show the complexity of the relationship between 
extraction and violence, and how the relationships may differ depending on 
the type of resource extraction. Firstly, I will discuss the relationship between 
private mineral extraction, followed by private oil and gas extraction, in 
country-years where resource extraction occurred. Secondly, I will discuss how 
ownership of mineral extraction and oil and gas extraction relates to low, 
medium and high levels of violence. Third, I will discuss the how the relationships 
changed when comparing the different types of ownership to observations 
with no resource extraction. Lastly, I will discuss the regional comparison of the 
relationship between ownership of extraction and the level of violence.  
First, the analysis of the ordinal logistic regression for private mineral extraction 
shows a strong, and significant negative relationship with the level of violence. 
The results from this regression show that the likelihood of higher level of 
violence decreases when there private mineral extraction. Furthermore, the 
results for this regression hold when introduced to the additional control 
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variables, unemployment rate and year. In the ordinal logistic regressions, I am 
only looking at the relationship between ownership of resources and the 
severity of violence, when resource extraction occurs. Therefore, the results for 
state-owned mineral extraction mirror the results for private mineral extraction. 
The regressions show that for state-owned mineral extraction, the level of 
violence is likely to increase. These results support my hypotheses, for private 
ownership and low-level violence, and state-ownership and high-level violence. 
The analysis of the ordinal logistic regression for private oil and gas extraction 
also shows a strong, and significant negative relationship with the level of 
violence. We see that when there is oil and gas extraction, the likelihood of 
higher levels of violence decreases if the extraction is privately owned, and 
subsequently, violence is likely to increase if there is state-owned oil and gas 
extraction. Additionally, these results continue to hold when introduced to 
additional control variables, unemployment and year. Therefore, I can say that 
these results prove to be robust. The results from the ordinal logistic regression for 
oil and gas ownership also show support for my hypotheses, that private 
ownership is likely to experience low-level violence, and state-ownership is likely 
to experience high-level violence. Next I will discuss the results across low, 
medium and high level violence, and whether the results still hold and continue 
to support my hypotheses. 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results 
The second regression performed as part of the robustness tests in the analysis 
chapter shows the multinomial logistic regression for the three levels of violence 
for private mineral extraction in Model 1 and private oil and gas extraction in 
Model 2. In this regression we see how the ownership of resource extraction 
relates to low-level, medium-level and high-level violence when no violence is 
used as the base level, in country-years where resource extraction occurs. The 
results for Model 1 show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
high-level violence and private mineral extraction, this suggests that countries 
with private mineral extraction are likely to see a decrease in high-level 
violence. Alternatively, the regressions for low-level and medium-level violence 
show positive relationships with private mineral extraction. The small positive 
coefficients of low (0.558) and medium (0.053) level violence, in addition to the 
coefficient for high-level violence of -1.153, suggest that the results from the first 
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ordinal logistic regression, of the negative relationship between private mineral 
extraction and the level of violence, were being driven by the strong negative 
relationship with high-level violence. The relationship discussed here continues 
to show support for my hypotheses, particularly hypothesis two, because as a 
result of the negative relationship with private mineral extraction and high-level 
violence that high level violence is strongly related to state-owned private 
mineral extraction.  
The multinomial logistic regression for Model 2 shows a negative relationship 
between private oil and gas extraction at all levels of violence, with the 
strongest and most significant result showing for medium-level violence. The 
result for medium-level violence and private oil and gas extraction estimates 
that there is likely to be a decrease in medium level violence when oil and gas 
extraction is privately owned, and conversely, we are likely to expect an 
increase in medium-level violence if oil and gas extraction is state-owned. 
These results continue to support my hypotheses for both private and state-
owned oil and gas extraction. The results continue to show that there is a strong 
relationship between private ownership of resource extraction and low-level 
violence across Latin America and Africa.  
No Extraction Comparison Results 
Thirdly, I conducted further regressions to test whether the relationship between 
ownership structure and the severity of violence held when comparing private 
and state-owned resource extraction, to no extraction. The ordinal logistic 
regressions performed show the likelihood of the level of violence increasing 
when a country-year shifts from no extraction, to either private or state-owned 
extraction, for mineral and oil and gas extraction. The regression for mineral 
extraction continues to show that when mineral extraction is state-owned the 
likelihood of higher levels of violence increases, significantly more than when 
mineral extraction is privately owned. Furthermore, the ordinal logistic regression 
for oil and gas extraction shows a strong positive relationship between state-
owned oil and gas extraction, which suggests that the likelihood of higher levels 
of violence increases significantly more than private owned oil and gas. These 
results show support for my hypothesis that state-owned extraction is likely to 
experience high-level violence. 
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Additionally, I performed a multinomial logistic regression showing the 
relationship between privately owned and state-owned resource extraction, 
where the base category is no violence. This regression tells us what direction 
the level of violence is likely to go, when a country-year moves from no 
extraction, to either state-owned or privately owned extraction. In Model 1, 
which represents mineral ownership, we see a significant strong negative 
relationship between private mineral ownership and high-level violence, and a 
significant negative relationship between low-level violence and state-owned 
mineral extraction. These results suggest that the likelihood of higher levels of 
violence decreases when mineral extraction is private, and that the likelihood 
of low-level violence decreases when mineral ownership is state-owned, 
compared to no extraction. In Model 2, we see the results for oil and gas 
extraction. Model 2 shows that there is a significant positive relationship 
between state-owned oil and gas extraction and medium level violence, as 
well as for high-level violence. The regression for oil and gas ownership suggests 
that the likelihood of medium and high levels of violence increases when oil 
and gas extraction is state-owned compared to no extraction.   
Regional Comparison Results 
Next I will discuss how the relationships between resource ownership and 
severity of violence differ when comparing Africa to Latin America for private 
mineral extraction and private oil and gas extraction. The ordinal logistic 
regression comparing Africa and Latin America, in country-years where 
extraction occurs, shows that in Africa, when mineral extraction is privately 
owned, the likelihood of higher levels of violence decreases significantly. 
Additionally, the regression for oil and gas extraction in Latin America shows a 
significant negative relationship between private ownership and the level of 
violence. This suggests that the likelihood of higher levels of violence is 
significantly decreased when oil and gas extraction is privately owned. The 
strength of these results suggests that the initial results, from the previous 
regressions that show significant negative relationships between private 
ownership of resource extraction and the severity of violence, could be driven 
by the results shown in the ordinal logistic regression that compares Africa and 
Latin America. The strong relationships described here provide further support 
for my hypotheses, that private ownership of resource extraction is more likely 
to experience low-level violence. Additionally, these results show that the 
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relationships between resource ownership and violence can differ depending 
on the locations; because different places have a different natural resource, 
and they have different populations that could be motivated by different 
factors (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009; Switzer, 2001). In the next section I will 
discuss what these findings mean for the literature of resource-conflicts.  
Findings 
The findings discussed above show that there is support for both my hypotheses 
regarding private ownership and lower levels of violence and state-owned 
extraction and higher levels of violence. As discussed in the literature review 
chapter of this thesis, there is a gap in the existing literature where there is little 
evaluation of the relationship between the types of resource ownership and 
how this can affect the level of violence experienced. Wegenast (2015) was 
one exception to the resource-conflict literature, as his article addressed how 
ownership of hydrocarbon production (oil and natural gas) affects the 
potential for internal conflict in 40 countries between 1989 and 2010 (T. 
Wegenast, 2015). Wegenast (2015) found that ‘state-controlled oil and gas 
production fosters internal violence’, while privately owned production does 
‘not affect the risk of intrastate violence’ (T. Wegenast, 2015). In addition, 
Wegenast (2015) uses greed and government spending to explain the 
relationship between state-owned hydrocarbon production and the onset of 
intrastate conflict (T. Wegenast, 2015). In comparison to Wegenast’s (2015) 
results, this thesis shows similar results, in regard to state-owned oil and gas 
extraction; however, this thesis builds on this further. This thesis shows the effect 
of ownership of resource extraction on the level of violence, this thesis also 
examines the effect of the ownership of mineral extraction in addition to oil and 
gas extraction, and this thesis can show the effect of private ownership 
compared to state-ownership in addition to the effect of each form of 
ownership in comparison to no resource extraction.  
In the theory chapter I argued that potential rebel groups will anticipate the 
response they are likely to receive from the government and the resource 
extraction company, and will initiate either low-level violence when resource 
extraction is privately owned, or will initiate high-level violence when resource 
extraction is state-owned. The type of ownership of resources, whether privately 
	   112	  
owned or state-owned, influences the behaviour and decisions of potential 
rebels. Private resource extraction companies are more likely to provide 
concessions and compensate aggrieved groups, or encourage the 
government to do so, in order to avoid the larger costs associated with higher 
levels of conflict, being loss of life, loss of profit as a result of stalled operations, 
and potential loss of reputation in the international market. Therefore, potential 
rebels will anticipate the behaviour of private extraction firms and initiate low-
level violence because it will be the most effective strategy. Conversely, state-
owned resource extraction companies are more likely to pass the costs of 
violence and conflict on to the state, which has the ability to absorb the costs 
associated with conflict and violence (profit, life and reputation). Therefore, 
potential rebel groups will find that low-level violence and extortion is 
ineffective, and will need to escalate their efforts in order to pressure the state 
and the company to address their demands.  
The mix of grievance and opportunity theories discussed in the theory chapter 
of this thesis provided an understanding of why potential rebel groups will use 
either high or low-level violence depending on whether resource extraction 
was state-owned or privately owned. The results of this study have confirmed 
that there is a relationship between privately owned resource extraction and 
lower levels of violence, and a relationship between state-owned resource 
extraction and higher levels of violence, in Latin America and Africa from 1989-
2014. These results are particularly strong when I compare the two regions in my 
sample, where Latin America has a strong relationship between low levels of 
violence and private oil and gas ownership, and Africa has a strong relationship 
between low levels of violence and private ownership of mineral extraction. 
Despite the difference in regional relationships, the results still confirm my 
hypotheses. The results and findings discussed in this thesis have provided 
further understanding, within the resource-conflict literature, of the relationship 
between ownership of resource extraction and the severity of violence.  
Further Research 
This thesis provides explanations for the relationships between resource 
extraction and violence severity, however these explanations are limited, and 
will require further research to fully illustrate the relationship between resource 
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extraction and conflict around the world. The analysis undertaken in this thesis is 
limited in its geographic scope, as well as the scope of violence that is 
measured. Further research into the ownership of resources worldwide by 
expanding the scope to include all resource-producing countries will benefit 
scholarship in this field. I would expect to see the relationships between 
ownership of resource extraction and the severity of violence to differ across 
other regions, as shown in the regression comparing Africa to Latin America in 
this study, the regions differ in terms of resource endowments, population size, 
history and type of government. Furthermore, research with more inclusive 
measures of violence, as this thesis attempts to capture low-level violence 
through the best estimate of fatalities within a country-year. Utilising geo-
referenced event data would compliment a study looking at the effect that 
resources can have on violence. In particular, being able to spatially 
disaggregate violence and the location of resources being extracted; this will 
enable a researcher to be able to correlate violent events with resource 
extraction. Additionally, research into the group concentration, using for 
example the Minorities at Risk dataset, within geographical regions that 
experience violence, in addition to data on the ownership of resource 
extraction, could add further insight to the literature. Due to the scope of this 
thesis, I was unable to expand this research across additional regions. 
The results produced in this thesis suggest that private ownership of resource 
extraction and the severity of violence are related. The results and conclusions 
of this thesis pave the way for further research into the mechanisms that drive 
the decisions for rebel groups to instigate violence, the forms of violence they 
use. In particular, further research into the use and effectiveness of non-violent 
methods when there resource extraction is privately owned. Additionally, 
further research could investigate the decisions and activity associated with the 
escalation from low-level violence to civil war when there is state-owned 
resource extraction. For example, do weak rebel groups really opt out of 
rebellion when resource extraction is state-owned? And do rebel groups really 
think that because the company is privately owned that they will be able to 
extract concessions and the state will be less willing to repress? Furthermore, 
research into the impact of specific types of resources, Wegenast (2015) looked 
at hydrocarbons, as have many other resource-conflict scholars, in addition to 
others who argue that lootable resources are highly correlated to violence 
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(Collier & Hoefffler, 2012; Fjelde, 2009; Macartan Humphreys, 2005; Janus, 2012; 
M. L. Ross, 2004; T. Wegenast, 2015). This research has looked at hydrocarbons in 
addition to capital-intensive mineral resources; further research into the 
ownership and control of resources such as water could complement this 
research, and provide more sources for companies, scholars and policy makers 
around the world. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis has outlined the literature on natural resources and 
conflict, and has demonstrated that there is a gap where ownership of 
resource extraction and the impact the type of ownership has on the severity of 
violence countries experience. Through the theory chapter, I have explained 
the mechanisms that suggest why the type of ownership of resource extraction, 
state-owned or private, could affect the decisions of groups to instigate 
violence, particularly different levels of violence, depending on the type of 
ownership. Furthermore, within the theory chapter, I explain why private 
ownership of resource extraction can encourage different behaviour in 
potential rebel groups, compared to state-owned resource extraction. I have 
explained the methodology of this study, how I coded the ownership of 
resource extraction, how I collected information to build a new dataset on the 
structure of resource extraction ownership, and how used multivariate, bivariate 
and descriptive statistics to analyse this data. And finally, I have conducted an 
analysis of the relationship between private and state-owned resource 
extraction and level of violence. I found that private ownership of resources is 
correlated with lower-levels of violence, and state-owned resource extraction is 
correlated with higher-levels of violence. As a result of the analysis provided in 
this thesis I can confidently confirm that the results support my hypotheses. 
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